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I. INTRODUCTION
The standard liability insurance policy contains two related
promises undertaken by the insurer. First, in the "primary cover-
age" or "indemnity" clause, the insurance company agrees to pay
all covered claims and judgments against the insured.1 The insur-
ance company also obligates itself to defend any suit brought
against the insured that alleges and seeks damages for a covered
injury, even if the allegations of the complaint are groundless,
false, or fraudulent. These "indemnity" and "duty to defend"
clauses are substantially the same in all American liability insur-
ance policies.? The two clauses interrelate because the insurer is
promising to defend and indemnify against only those claims
which are within the policy's coverage. s In addition, most insur-
1. A covered claim is typically an "occurrence" such as "an accident, including injurious
exposure to conditions, which results, during the policy period, in bodily injury or property
damage neither expected nor intended from the standpoint of the insured." National Union
Fire Ins. Co. v. Lenox Liquors, Inc., 358 So. 2d 533, 535-36 (Fla. 1977) (emphasis deleted).
2. A typical insurance policy contains the following provision:
The company will pay on behalf of the insured all sums which the insured shall
become legally obligated to pay as damages because of
A. bodily injury or
B. property damage
to which this insurance applies, caused by an occurrence, and the company
shall have the right and duty to defend any suit against the insured seeking
damages on account of such bodily injury or property damage, even if any of
the allegations of the suit are groundless, false or fraudulent, and may make
such investigation and settlement of any claim or suit as it deems expedient, but
the company shall not be obligated to pay any claim or judgment or to defend
any suit after the applicable limit of the company's liability has been exhausted
by payment of judgments or settlements.
7C J. APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 4682, at 22 n.9 (1979) (emphasis added).
3. Even though the clauses are related because they both depend on covered claims,
courts view these provisions as distinct obligations. As stated in 44 AM. JuR. 2D Insurance
§ 1539, at 420-21 (1969):
The duty to defend does not depend upon the insurer's liability to pay, however,
since the insurer's duty to defend stems from its own contractual obligation to
the insured, while its ultimate liability to pay on behalf of the insured depends
upon the law of negligence, and since the usual policy provisions requiring the
insurer to defend cannot be construed to impose such a duty only in the case of
successful suits against the insured. Accordingly, the insurer may be obligated to
defend although not held liable to pay. In other words, the insurer may be obli-
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ance policies also contain express exclusions for events that are be-
yond the scope and coverage of the policy.
When the allegations of the complaint against the insured set
forth facts outside the scope of a policy's primary coverage, or facts
that fall under an exclusionary provision which negates coverage,
the insurer will generally have no duty to defend. The converse of
this proposition does not obtain, however. Although the insurer
may have no duty to defend a particular action, it still may be
liable under the primary coverage clause to indemnify the insured
against an adverse judgment.
If the insurer breaches its duty to defend, it is liable for the
insured's costs of defending the underlying lawsuit, including rea-
sonable attorney's fees. As a result, the insurer's interests are in
avoiding the costs of defending a suit that it has no obligation to
defend, and in avoiding potential liability when it makes an erro-
neous determination regarding its duty to defend.5 The insurer
therefore seeks a precise rule to distinguish between those suits it
must defend and those it may refuse to defend without subse-
quently incurring liability. Further, the insurer prefers to reach its
decision promptly so that it can assume control of the insured's
defense.6 The insured similarly has an interest in a clear rule to
determine when the insurer must undertake its duty to defend.
Having paid the policy premium, the insured believes it is entitled
to this representation and desires advance knowledge of the scope
of its rights as a policyholder against the insurer.
This article discusses and analyzes the various rules that have
developed for determining whether an insurer has a duty to de-
fend. While the initial focus is on Florida law, this article also
takes a multijurisdictional approach and attempts to formulate
specific rules for a number of identifiable fact situations in this
area of insurance law.
gated to defend so-called "groundless" suits-namely, suits the allegations of
which bring them within the coverage of the policy, but which are decided in
favor of the insured.
(footnotes omitted).
4. Green v. Aetna Ins. Co., 349 F.2d 919, 925 (5th Cir. 1965).
5. An insurance company declines a tender of defense at its own peril, for if the court
later finds that the insurer's refusal was wrongful, the insurer will be liable for the insured's
cost of defense. See, e.g., Tennessee Corp. v. Lamb Bros. Constr. Co., 265 So. 2d 533 (Fla. 2d
DCA 1972).
6. Typically, an insurer's experienced counsel can more capably minimize the magni-
tude of adverse judgments than can independent counsel for the insured.
19821
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
II. AN OVERVIEW: THE EXCLUSIVE PLEADING AND FACTUAL TESTS
The traditional rule for determining the insurer's duty to de-
fend is that if the allegations of the complaint against the insured
state facts that fairly bring the claim within the policy's coverage,
the insurer has a duty to defend, even if those allegations are
groundless, false, or fraudulent. Stated differently, the allegations
of the complaint against the insured solely govern the insurer's
duty to defend; the rule precludes the court's consideration of un-
pleaded actual facts.
The language of the duty to defend clause in the insurance
policy is the basis of the rule. The typical provision reads: "LIABIL-
ITY COVERAGE: . . . [T]he company shall defend any suit alleging
such bodily injury or property damage7 and seeking damages which
are payable under the terms of this policy, even if any of the alle-
gations of the suit are groundless," false, or fraudulent . . . ., In-
surers interpret this language to mean that the parties intended
that the allegations of the complaint against the insured control
the duty to defend. 10 Thus, the complaint must allege facts that
when fairly read bring the cause of action within the policy's cover-
7. "Property damage" usually refers to actual physical damage. Accordingly, an insurer
has no duty to defend a garage that lost a lock seat mechanism from a customer's car,
because the loss does not constitute "property damage" under the garage's liability insur-
ance policy. Patriot Gen. Ins. Co. v. Automobile Sales, Inc., 372 So. 2d 187 (Fla. 3d DCA
1979).
8. Even though the insurer promises to defend "groundless" suits, this promise does
not obligate an insurer to defend a claim that would be beyond the policy's coverage if the
claimant prevailed. See Burd v. Sussex Mut. Ins. Co., 56 N.J. 383, 267 A.2d 7 (1970). This
conclusion is based on the meaning of "groundless" as used in liability policies. As the court
in Loftin v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 106 Ga. App. 287, 127 S.E.2d 53 (1962), explained:
The groundless suit which the insurer undertakes to defend is a suit containing
unsupportable allegations which on their face show coverage by the policy of the
liability asserted against the insured .... Whether or not the insured could be
liable to the injured claimant under the true facts is not determinative of the
groundlessness of the suit. For example, a suit is brought alleging injury and
damage arising out of the use of the insured automobile. In truth the automobile
involved was another automobile owned by the insured and not covered by the
policy. This is a groundless suit because the allegations show coverage, even
'though the insured may, or may not, be personally liable under the true
facts .... "But a distinction must be drawn between groundless suits and ac-
tions which, even if successful would not be within the policy coverage."
Id. at 291, 127 S.E.2d at 56-57 (quoting 7A J. APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE
§ 4684, at 448).
9. Ging v. American Liberty Ins. Co., 293 F. Supp. 756, 758 (N.D. Fla. 1968) (emphasis
added).
10. See, e.g., Travelers Ins. Co. v. Newsom, 352 S.W.2d 888, 893 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961).
The argument is rather unpersuasive since these provisions are part of standard form con-
tracts written by insurance companies.
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age. Once the allegations trigger coverage, and the resulting duty
to defend, it is irrelevant that those allegations prove to be false,
fraudulent, or groundless.11 Because the pleadings exclusively gov-
ern the duty to defend, this rule is labeled the "exclusive pleading
test."
There exists an exception to the exclusive pleading test: When
a variance develops between the untrue alleged facts activating an
exclusion and the unpleaded actual facts triggering coverage, the
actual facts should govern the duty to defend. Courts1 2 and com-
mentators"3 have noted the conflict between these polar views-the
exclusive pleading test and its exception, the factual test. The ob-
ject of this article is to demonstrate how courts have applied these
two rules in different factual settings, and to analyze which stan-
dard is more appropriate for determining whether a duty to defend
exists.
III. THE ORIGIN OF THE EXCLUSIVE PLEADING TEST
The seminal case of Lee v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.
1
4
firmly established the traditional rule for determining the exis-
tence of the insurer's duty to defend. In Lee the plaintiff entered
the insured proprietor's pet shop to purchase a monkey. Because
the monkeys were located on the fifth floor, the proprietor escorted
the plaintiff to the elevator, raised a protective gate, and invited
him inside. The plaintiff complied but fell to the bottom of the
11. The rule is stated in 7C J. APPLEMAN, supra note 2, § 4683, at 42:
An insurer's duty to defend an action against the insured is measured, in the
first instance, by the allegations in the plaintiff's pleadings, and if such pleadings
state facts bringing the injury within the coverage of the policy, the insurer must
defend, irrespective of the insured's ultimate liability to the plaintiff.
12. Green v. Aetna Ins. Co., 349 F.2d 919, 923 (5th Cir. 1965) (applying Telas law);
American Policyholders' Ins. Co. v. Cumberland Cold Storage Co., 373 A.2d 247, 250 n.1
(Me. 1977) (the most logical rule is one that predicates the duty to defend on the com-
plaint's allegations, even when the insurer has knowledge of contrary facts); Isenhart v. Gen-
eral Casualty Co. of Am., 233 Or. 49, 54, 377 P.2d 26, 28 (1962); Travelers Ins. Co. v. New-
som, 352 S.W.2d 888, 890 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961).
13. Dahoney, The Liability Insurer's Duty to Defend, 33 BAYLOR L. Rxv. 451 (1981).
See generally Comment, The Insurer's Duty to Defend Under a Liability Insurance Policy,
114 U. PA. L. REV. 734 (1966); Note, Use of the Declaratory Judgment to Determine a
Liability Insurer's Duty to Defend-Conflict of Interests, 41 IND. L.J. 87 (1965); Note, Lia-
bility Insurer's Duty to Defend: American Policyholders' Ins. Co. v. Cumberland Cold Stor-
age Co., 30 MF. L. REv. 295 (1979); Note, The Insurer's Duty to Defend Made Absolute:
Gray v. Zurich, 14 U.C.L.A. L. Rav. 1328 (1967); 30 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1019 (1955); 2 STA. L.
REv. 383 (1950); 5 WILLAMETTE L.J. 321 (1969); 6 Wm. MITCHELL L. Rv. 473 (1980); Annot.,
50 A.L.R.2D 458 (1956).
14. 178 F.2d 750 (2d Cir. 1949) (L. Hand, J.).
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shaft.15 The insurance policy in question contained a duty to de-
fend clause and several policy exclusions, one of which excluded
coverage for liability arising from the use of the elevator."' After
concluding that this exclusion applied,17 and that the insurer owed
no duty to indemnify the proprietor, Judge Learned Hand ana-
lyzed the duty to defend clause.
The clause read as follows: "[Insurer promises to] defend
* any suit against the Insured alleging injury, sickness, disease
or destruction covered by this Policy * * * even if such suit is
groundless, false or fraudulent." 18 In construing this language,
Judge Hand articulated the general rule:
This language means that the insurer will defend the suit, if the
injured party states a claim, which, qua claim, is for an injury
"covered" by the policy; it is the claim which determines the
insurer's duty to defend; and it is irrelevant that the insurer
may get information from the insured, or from anyone else,
which indicates, or even demonstrates, that the injury is not in
fact "covered."'"
Thus, the insurer's duty to defend depends solely on the scope of
the allegations against the insured. If those allegations fall within
the policy's coverage, the insurer must defend, even though the ac-
tual facts negate coverage, because the insurer has expressly prom-
ised to defend against all alleged covered claims, even if ground-
less, false, or fraudulent.2
In holding that the insurer owed a duty to defend, the court in
Lee observed that by merely comparing the complaint's allegations
to the policy's coverage, one could not determine whether the pol-
icy covered the alleged injury."1 The insurer therefore was obli-
15. Id. at 751. For a more detailed discussion of the facts, see Lee v. Aetna Casualty &
Sur. Co., 81 F. Supp. 1008, 1010 (S.D.N.Y. 1949).
16. 178 F.2d at 751.
17. The court concluded that the insured's action of inviting the plaintiff into the ele-
vator constituted a "use" of the elevator. Accordingly, the injured party's claim was within
the exclusionary provision of the policy. Id.
18. Id. (emphasis added).
19. Id. (emphasis added).
20. For a detailed discussion of this point, see infra notes 33-36 & 254-55 and accompa-
nying text.
21. As the court observed: "[Tihe complaint covered an injury which might, or might
not, have happened from the insured's 'use' of the elevator. . . ." 178 F.2d at 752. Indeed,
one could characterize this finding by the court as the operative fact in a narrow holding: If
the allegations of the complaint are inadequate or inconclusive respecting the duty to de-
fend, the insurer must defend, at least until it can confine the claim to a noncovered event.
Many courts have not read the Lee holding restrictively and in fact, have cited much of the
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gated to defend until it could confine the claim to a noncovered
event."
American jurisprudence traditionally has supported the exclu-
sive pleading test formulated in Lee for several reasons. First,
some courts observe that the rule is practical and efficient.28 The
insurer need only place the complaint alongside the policy, and if
any of the allegations are within its coverage, the insurer must de-
fend the lawsuit." Conversely, if the complaint shows noncoverage
or the applicability of a policy exclusion," the insurer may safely
decline the defense of the action. Other courts" that have adhered
Lee dicta so extensively that Lee now stands for several different propositions. See infra
note 50 and accompanying text.
22. 178 F.2d at 753. A recent citation of the rule is found in Oliver B. Cannon & Son v.
Fidelity & Casualty Co., 484 F. Supp. 1375 (D. Del. 1980) (applying Pennsylvania law). The
court stated the Pennsylvania rule as follows:
[WIhere the insurance contract obligates the insurer to defend the insured
against some of the claims in a complaint, the insurer must also defend against
other claims of the complaint which do not fall within the coverage of the policy
until the litigation reaches the point where it would be impossible to recover on
any of the claims falling within the coverage of the policy.
Id. at 1385.
23. See, e.g., Ross Island Sand & Gravel Co. v. General Ins. Co., 472 F.2d 750 (9th Cir.
1973):
Since... procedural law [in a Code pleading jurisdiction] requires a complaint
to state the facts which constitute the cause of action, a relatively simple and
businesslike rule calls upon the insurer to study that complaint and then to un-
dertake the defense any time the complaint alleges facts which, if proven at trial,
would or could give rise to liability under any theory of law creating a liability
covered by the insuring agreement.
Id. at 752.
24. Shaw v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 407 F.2d 813 (7th Cir. 1969); Steyer v.
Westvaco Corp., 450 F. Supp. 384 (D. Md. 1978); Travelers Indem. Co. v. Dingwell, 414 A.2d
220 (Me. 1980) (termed the method the "comparison test"); Kyllo v. Northland Chem. Co.,
209 N.W.2d 629 (N.D. 1973). The comparison test loses its efficacy, however, when the com-
plaint is ambiguous as to coverage or the applicability of an exclusion. See infra notes 158-
96 and accompanying text.
25. See, e.g., Amundsen v. Great Cent. Ins. Co., 451 S.W.2d 277 (Tex. Civ. App. 1970).
In Amundsen the court, applying the exclusive pleading test, compared the allegations of
the complaint with the insurance policy. It found that the complaint fell within a policy
exclusion, and consequently the insurer had no duty to defend. The insured argued that the
"exception" to the traditional rule applied. The court concluded, however, that Texas did
not recognize the exception and moreover, there was no variance between the alleged and
actual facts.
26. See, e.g., Travelers Ins. Co. v. Newsom, 352 S.W.2d 888 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961). The
court in Newsom reached what it called the "logical conclusion":
We pose the question: Why is the duty of the insurer to defend determina-
tive of the allegations in the third party's complaint? We answer our own ques-
tion with the very logical conclusion that the contract so provides wherein its
[sic] says, "the company shall defend any suit against the insured alleging such
injuries * * *." That is the coverage paid for by the insured.
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to the exclusive pleading test argue that the traditional view is the
more logical approach, because the policy language simply states
that the insurer will defend any suit alleging a covered injury.
Thus, the parties presumably intend that the allegations should
control the duty to defend; the courts should refuse to rewrite the
policy or read into it an additional duty to investigate the truthful-
ness of the underlying complaint.' 7 Another court has argued per-
suasively that if the insurer were required to look beyond the face
of the complaint in determining its duty to defend, the insurer
would have to speculate whether the plaintiff could prove the al-
leged facts.'8 Moreover, if the court were to look beyond the com-
plaint, and analyze the proof of actual facts, then the court could
not determine the insurer's duty to defend until after the underly-
ing trial's completion."
IV. THE DUTY TO DEFEND IN FLORIDA
A. The Exclusive Pleading Test
As a general rule, Florida follows the exclusive pleading test in
determining the existence of the insurer's duty to defend. One of
Id. at 893 (emphasis in original).
Evidently, the court felt bound by the policy language and would not rewrite the duty
to defend clause to include a duty to investigate statements that the insured or anyone else
may have made. Whether this conclusion was justified is explored in detail, infra notes 218-
36 and accompanying text. See also infra note 123 and accompanying text.
27. 352 S.W.2d at 893.
28. Isenhart v. General Casualty Co. of Am., 233 Or. 49, 54, 377 P.2d 26, 28-29 (1962).
Perhaps this reasoning best accounts for the general principle that the duty to defend is
broader than the duty to indemnify. The duty to defend is based on the alleged facts,
whether true or false. Accordingly, the insurer must defend all alleged covered claims. The
duty to indemnify, on the other hand, will only exist if the plaintiff's claim is proved to be a
covered occurrence. This, of course, will only occur after trial. See infra note 97.
29. Once the insurer has declined to defend the underlying lawsuit, the insured may
bring a declaratory judgment action in which the suit's actual facts will be proved. The
parties may litigate the duty to defend prior to the commencement of the underlying suit
against the insured. This provides support for the rule that the actual facts should govern
the duty to defend. One court has noted, however, that the availability of declaratory judg-
ment actions should not alter the traditional rule:
If we were to look beyond the complaint and engage in proof of actual facts,
then the separate declaratory judgment actions ... would become independent
trials of the facts which the [insured) would have to carry on at his expense.
Moreover, once an inquiry begins into the actual facts, the insured will have
already begun defending against liability, and the issue in respect to the insurer
will be its ultimate duty to indemnify, not its duty to defend. We see no reason
why the insured, whose insurer is obligated by contract to defend him, should
have to try the facts in a suit against his insurer in order to obtain a defense.
Travelers Indem. Co. v. Dingwell, 414 A.2d 220, 227 (Me. 1980).
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the earliest Florida cases to deal with the duty to defend was New
Amsterdam Casualty Co. v. Knowles."0 The insured, a convales-
cent home, sought a declaratory judgment to establish the insurer's
obligation to defend a suit brought by an injured patient. The pa-
tient's complaint alleged injuries sustained as a result of the negli-
gence of an attendant in the insured's employ. 1 Upon investiga-
tion the insured learned that when the attendant made his rounds,
he had found the bed bars down and the patient on the floor. The
insured surmised that the patient's injury was accidental. After the
insurer conducted its own investigation, it declined to defend the
suit because a policy exclusion denied coverage for claims "result-
ing from the rendering of any professional services or omission
thereof.82 The insurer argued that the actual facts revealed by its
investigation activated the policy exclusion, relieving the insurer of
an obligation to defend. The Supreme Court of Florida rejected
this contention. It held that since the allegations of the complaint
indicated the possibility of coverage, 8 the insurer had a duty to
defend, notwithstanding the possibility that the actual facts ascer-
tained by the insurer" or established at trial8 would come within
an exclusion and relieve the insurer of its duty to indemnify." In
30. 95 So. 2d 413 (Fla. 1957).
31. The plaintiff apparently injured himself when he fell out of bed. Id. at 414.
32. Id. at 413.
33. See Lee v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 178 F.2d 750 (2d Cir. 1949).
34. The Lee court concluded that if the complaint comprehends an injury that "may
be" within the policy, then the insurer is obligated to defend. Id. at 753. The court
explained:
This language [the duty to defend provision] means that the insurer will defend
the suit, if the injured party states a claim, which, qua claim, is for an injury
"covered" by the policy; it is the claim which determines the insurer's duty to
defend; and it is irrelevant that the insurer may get information from the in-
sured, or from any one else, which indicates, or even demonstrates, that the in-
jury is not in fact "covered."
Id. at 751 (emphasis added).
35. See, e.g., Accredited Bond Agencies, Inc. v. Gulf Ins. Co., 352 So. 2d 1252 (Fla. 1st
DCA 1977). In Accredited the underlying complaint alleged an employment relationship
between Duggs, a bail bonds agent, and the insured, a bail bonds company. The policy cov-
ered actions by the insured's employees. At trial the actual facts established that Duggs was
an independent contractor whose actions were not covered by the policy. The trial judge
ruled that because no coverage existed, there could be no duty to defend. The appellate
court reversed and held that the allegations which triggered a duty to defend controlled,
despite the existence of facts falling within the exclusion. See infra notes 242-64 and accom-
panying text.
36. As the court concluded, "If there actually existed a set of facts so different as to.
relieve the appellant from liability, that would be developed only in an eventual trial. But
the appellant could not meanwhile decline any participation in the action." 95 So. 2d at 415.
In Klaesen Bros. v. Harbor Ins. Co., 410 So. 2d 611 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982), the plaintiff
1982]
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short, the court refused to give credence to the insurer's investiga-
tion or to allow the insurer to decide for itself whether a duty to
defend existed:
When we undertake to reason that an insurance company
may issue a policy ... and insure for a price, against the loss
from hazards incident to the operation, and then arrogate to it-
self the right of deciding that, after all, an injury with which no
one except an attendant seems to have had any connection, re-
sulted from professional services, hence responsibility to defend
did not arise, we come full cycle in our thinking.'7
The decisions in Knowles and subsequent cases" clearly es-
tablished that in order to determine the insurer's duty to defend,
courts should consider exclusively the complaint's allegations in
light of the policy coverage. If the allegations contained facts
which, if proved, would establish the insurer's obligation to indem-
nify under the policy, then the insurer has a duty to defend.39
sued the insured, the owner and operator of a carnival attraction, for the wrongful death of
Mr. Hardison caused by the insured's employee, Pitts. The complaint merely alleged that
Pitte acted within the scope of his employment and that his job required him to sleep on the
premises. The actual facts revealed that Pitts was hired to erect rides and that he had shot
Hardison following a drunken barroom brawl at 3:00 a.m., well after the carnival was closed
for the evening. The insurer argued that since the insured denied that Pitts was acting
within the scope of his employment, no coverage and consequently no duty to defend could
arise. The court rejected the contention, holding that once the complaint alleges facts within
coverage, the duty attaches and the actual facts are only relevant to the duty to indemnify.
Id. at 613.
37. 95 So. 2d at 415.
38. See, e.g., Bennett v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 132 So. 2d 788 (Fla. 1st DCA 1961). In
Bennett the insured brought a declaratory judgment action to determine whether its insurer
had to defend against a suit claiming that the insured had caused flood damage to business
property. The property owners charged that the insured's negligent and willful reconstruc-
tion of a dam was the proximate cause of flooding on the owners' land after a heavy rain.
The policy provided that the insurer "would pay on behalf of the insured all sums which the
insured should become legally obligated to pay as damages because of injury to or destruc-
tion of property 'caused by accident,' [and would] defend any suit ... alleging such injury
or destruction ...." Id. at 789 (emphasis added). Thus, the duty to defend depended on
whether there was a covered claim, i.e., whether an accident caused the alleged injury.
In concluding that rain in South Florida was not "unexpected" from the standpoint of
the insured and therefore was not an "accident," the court relied on the exclusive pleading
test: "[A] public liability carrier's duty to defend the insured in an action brought against
him is to be determined from the allegations of the complaint, declaration, or other state-
ment of the cause of action, filed in such action against the insured." Id. at 790.
39. This conclusion follows even though the allegations of the complaint are only par-
tially within the policy's coverage. See, e.g., American Hardware Mut. Ins. Co. v. Miami
Leasing & Rentals, 362 So. 2d 28 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978); Stevens v. Horne, 325 So. 2d 459 (Fla.
4th DCA 1975); Travelers Indem. Co. v. Thomas, 315 So. 2d 111 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975), cert.
denied, 336 So. 2d 108 (Fla. 1976); Garden Sanctuary, Inc. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 292
So. 2d 75 (Fla. 2d DCA 1974); St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Hodor, 200 So. 2d 205 (Fla.
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In Florida the exclusive pleading test controls when the com-
plaint either triggers coverage or indicates the applicability of a
policy exclusion.40 The latter possibility occurred in Consolidated
Mutual Insurance Co. v. Ivy Liquors, Inc.,4' when a customer in-
stituted a lawsuit against the insured liquor store for injuries re-
sulting from an alleged assault and battery committed by the store
manager. The policy provided that the insurer would defend any
suit alleging an injury that resulted from an accident, "including
assault and battery unless committed by or at the direction of the
insured."41 The insurer withdrew from the case after its investiga-
tion revealed that the policy did not cover the incident. Relying on
the exclusive pleading test, the court found that the store manager
committed the assault in furtherance of the insured's business and
concluded that the assault did not constitute an "accident" within
the meaning of the policy.4' No duty to defend existed because the
claim as alleged fell within a policy exclusion."
3d DCA 1967).
Stevens v. Home involved a union employees' strike against Southern Bell Telephone
Company. When Home, a nonunion employee, crossed the picket line, several striking mem-
bers taunted him and displayed a sign entitled "Ted Hore, Super Scab." Home brought
suit alleging that the union was either vicariously liable for the conduct of its members who
were acting as its agents, servants, or employees, or directly liable because it had directed its
members' acts. When the insurer declined to defend the insured union, the insurer was
impleaded as a third-party defendant. On appeal the court held that the insurer had a duty
to defend the entire suit if one of the alleged alternate theories of liability stated facts
bringing the injury within the policy's coverage. 325 So. 2d at 461. But cf. Battisti v. Conti-
nental Casualty Co., 406 F.2d 1318 (5th Cir. 1969) (applying Florida law, the court held that
the complaint against the insured failed to aver any facts partially within and outside the
policy's coverage).
40. Battisti v. Continental Casualty Co., 406 F.2d at 1321 (citing 7A J. APLEMAN, IN-
SURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 4683, at 445 n.37 (2d ed. 1962)).
41. 185 So. 2d 187 (Fla. 3d DCA 1966).
42. Id. at 188. Several courts have found this provision inherently ambiguous because
the clause offers coverage for assault and battery as being within the definition of "acci-
dent," and simultaneously excludes assault and battery if committed by, or at the direction
of, the insured. Moreover, the clause does not contain language of exclusion but rather of
affirmation. See Lowell v. Maryland Casualty Co., 65 Cal. 2d 298, 419 P.2d 180, 54 Cal.
Rptr. 116 (1966).
43. 185 So. 2d at 189; accord Briscoe v. Travelers Indem. Co., 18 Wash. App. 662, 571
P.2d 226 (1977) (insurer declined to defend because injuries sustained in alleged assault and
battery did not constitute an "accident" within terms of policy). Not all jurisdictions agree
on this point. See infra notes 125-56 and accompanying text.
44. 185 So. 2d at 189; see also Louisville Title Ins. Co. v. Guerard, 409 So. 2d 514 (Fla.
5th DCA 1982) (insurer had no duty to defend complaint that sought to establish a prescrip-
tive easement since title insurance policy excluded such claims); Continental Casualty Co. v.
Schaubel, 380 So. 2d 483 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980) (charges against insured for libel, slander, and
invasion of privacy were within policy exclusion); Federal Ins. Co. v. Applestein, 377 So. 2d
229 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979) (insurer had no duty to defend because allegations of intentional
1982]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
B. Policy Exclusions: Where the Exclusive Pleading Test Fails
One of the major criticisms of the exclusive pleading test
stems from the application of the test to policy exclusions.' Most,
if not all, insurance policies contain some sort of exclusionary pro-
vision precluding coverage for certain acts. Although these exclu-
sionary provisions vary with the type of policy involved, they all
contain language stating in essence that intentional injuries caused
by the insured are not covered risks. Accordingly, if the injured
plaintiff alleges an intentional act, without also alleging negli-
gence,'6 the exclusive pleading test compels the court to rule prior
to the underlying trial that no duty to defend exists. Several courts
and commentators' 7 have argued that this is unjust: Injured plain-
tiffs typically allege an intentional injury, even if only negligence is
involved, in order to provide a predicate for the recovery of puni-
tive damages. Then, if the evidence does not support the plaintiff's
claim of an intentional injury, the plaintiff can change his theory
during the trial to conform to the evidence by amending his com-
plaint 48 to include a negligent injury, absent prejudice to the op-
injury against insured clearly indicated a policy exclusion); Prieto v. Continental Ins. Co.,
358 So. 2d 851 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978) (allegations of complaint demonstrated applicability of
policy exclusion for "completed operations"); Atkins v. Bellefonte Ins. Co., 342 So. 2d 837
(Fla. 3d DCA 1977) (insurer had no duty to defend because automobile collision fell within
policy exclusion denying coverage for ownership or use of an automobile); Buchwald v.
Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 319 So. 2d 164 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975) (insurer had no duty to
defend suit alleging willful assault and battery because policy expressly excluded coverage
for intentional torts). For a more extensive discussion of whether an alleged exclusion
should automatically negate a duty to defend, see infra notes 125-56 and accompanying
text.
45. An exclusion can take two forms: either the claim does not fall within the policy
definition of "occurrence" or "accident," or a list of enumerated events in the policy ex-
pressly excludes the claim from coverage.
46. Of course, if the complaint contains allegations of fact within as well as outside of
coverage, the insurer is obligated to defend the entire suit. See supra cases cited note 39.
47. Comment, supra note 13.
48. If the plaintiff amends his complaint to include an allegation of negligence, and the
insured properly notifies the insurer, then the insurer must undertake defense at that point.
If the insurer refuses, it will be liable for the costs of defense incurred after the application
to amend the complaint. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Hodor, 200 So. 2d 205 (Fla. 3d
DCA 1967); cf. C.A. Fielland, Inc. v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 297 So. 2d 122 (Fla. 2d DCA
1974) (although the duty to defend is determined initially from the allegations of the com-
plaint, if it later appears that the plaintiff is pursuing covered claims not originally pleaded,
the insurer must defend on proper notification). But cf. Sussman v. American Sur. Co., 345
F.2d 679 (5th Cir. 1965) (original complaint in personal injury action did not allege facts
within coverage, and insurer was neither notified of the amended complaint nor given an




posing party.4 The exclusive pleading test, therefore, poses
problems for all parties because the original complaint may not ac-
curately reflect the theory upon which the injured party may ulti-
mately proceed against the insured. 50
The shortcoming of the exclusive pleading test is even more
evident when the insured party notifies his insurer that the injury
was accidental, despite the complaint's contrary allegations of in-
tentional injury, and the insurer could ascertain the true facts after
a reasonable investigation. Capoferri v. Allstate Insurance Co.51
exemplifies the unfairness that can result from the rigid applica-
tion of this rule. The insured, Mr. Capoferri, pleaded guilty in traf-
fic court to police charges of careless driving, stemming from an
accident with an automobile driven by Mr. Dimon. Soon thereaf-
ter, Dimon brought suit against the insured, alleging that Capoferri
willfully assaulted him by deliberately colliding with his automo-
bile. The complaint sought compensatory and punitive damages.
Capoferri notified his insurer of Dimon's complaint and gave a
sworn statement that the collision occurred when his foot acciden-
tally slipped off the brake and struck the accelerator.5 2 The insurer
49. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.190(b).
50. This principle may also work in favor of the insurer. If a portion of the claim is
within coverage, the insurer must defend until the covered portion is eliminated from the
suit. Buckner v. Physicians Protective Trust Fund, 376 So. 2d 461 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979); C.A.
Fielland, Inc. v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 297 So. 2d 122, 127 (Fla. 2d DCA 1974) (dictum);
cf. Babcock & Wilcox Co. v. Parsons Corp., 430 F.2d 531 (8th Cir. 1970) (applying Nebraska
law) (plaintiff's answers to insured's interrogatories did not unequivocally narrow claim to
one excluded by policy). But cf. Kings Point West, Inc. v. North River Ins. Co., 412 So. 2d
379 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982) (once complaint triggers duty to defend, subsequent filings indicat-
ing noncoverage do not negate the defense obligation).
51. 322 So. 2d 625 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975).
52. Id. at 626. Capoferri's statement triggered coverage. Later, when the insurer ex-
amined the bare allegations of Dimon's complaint, it withdrew its defense because the
charges activated the exclusionary provisions of the policy. The court in Capoferri disre-
garded the insured's sworn statement as irrelevant to the determination of the insurer's
duty to defend.
In St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Thomas, 273 So. 2d 117 (Fla. 4th DCA 1973), the
opposite fact situation existed. In Thomas the underlying complaint indicated coverage; the
insured's version, corroborated by a fellow passenger, fell within the policy exclusion. The
Thomas court concluded that once the complaint triggered coverage and a duty to defend,
information received from the insured or anyone else does not obviate the duty. Thus, once
the duty to defend exists because of the complaint, the duty attaches and is not terminated
by the actual facts negating coverage because the insurer promises to defend groundless,
false, or fraudulent suits. Id. at 119 n.2; see Lee v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 178 F.2d 750,
751 (2d Cir. 1949) (L. Hand, J.) ("[A]nd it is irrelevant that the insurer may get information
from the insured, or from anyone else, which indicates, or even demonstrates, that the in-
jury is not in fact 'covered.' "); see also Kings Point West, Inc. v. North River Ins. Co. 412
So. 2d 379 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982) (insurer breached its duty to defend when it wrongfully
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initially undertook the defense, but then declined any further rep-
resentation on the ground that the policy excluded intentional in-
juries."5 The insured retained private counsel, who answered the
plaintiff's complaint and filed a third-party action against the in-
surer, seeking indemnity for any judgment against the insured and
the costs of defending the principal action.
A jury tried the main action and returned a verdict for the
insured. The trial court, however, granted the insurer's motion for
summary judgment on the third-party complaint. On appeal, the
insured argued that an insurer cannot lawfully withdraw its repre-
sentation on the bare allegations of a complaint that charges an
intentional injury, especially when the insurer has substantial evi-
dence from its own investigation to show that either the lawsuit is
groundless54 or the plaintiff will prevail on a covered claim.55
refused tender of complaint alleging a covered event, even though later filings showed non-
coverage); Klaesen Bros. v. Harbor Ins. Co., 410 So. 2d 611 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982) (insurer had
duty to defend wrongful death action alleging employee had acted within scope of his em-
ployment, despite the contrary actual facts); supra notes 32-36 and infra notes 242-64 and
accompanying text.
In all standard liability insurance policies, as in Capoferri, the defense clause's language
specifically covers a situation in which the complaint triggers coverage, but the defense
clause is otherwise silent on the possibility of false or groundless allegations falling within
an exclusion. The rationale of Capoferri is therefore based on the negative implication of
the policy language. Some courts have refused to interpret the policy in this manner, hold-
ing that false allegations of an excluded event will not relieve the insurer of a defense obli-
gation. See, e.g., Conner v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 496 P.2d 770, 775 (Okla. 1972). Courts are
divided on the question whether the insured's version of the incident is relevant to the
determination of a defense obligation. Compare Maryland Casualty Co. v. Knorpp, 370
S.W.2d 898, 902 (Tex. Civ. App. 1963) (Chapman, J., concurring) (court erred in considering
insured's affidavit along with third-party complaint) with United States Fire Ins. Co. v.
Schnabel, 504 P.2d 847, 850 n.7 (Alaska 1972) (insurer must give weight to insured's version
of incident contained in his answer, if version appears reasonable). But see Carolina Aircraft
Corp. v. American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 517 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1975) (applying Florida law,
court held that plaintiff's complaint, not insured's answer, governs duty to defend).
53. 322 So.2d at 626.
54. Id. It is important to examine briefly the language of a duty to defend clause, which
usually binds the company to defend any suit alleging an injury that is covered by the pol-
icy, even if the allegations are groundless, false, or fraudulent. Properly construed, this lan-
guage means that the insurer has a positive duty to defend if the allegations include a cov-
ered claim, even if those allegations are groundless, false, or fraudulent. But the converse of
the proposition-that if the allegations indicate an exclusion, the company need not defend,
even if these allegations are groundless, false, or fraudulent-does not necessarily and logi-
cally follow from the policy's language. Indeed, as to this factual setting the rights of the
parties seem ambiguous. See infra notes 201-05 and accompanying text; see also Conner v.
Transamerica Ins. Co., 496 P.2d 770 (Okla. 1972) (groundless allegations of an exclusion did
not relieve insurer of defense obligation).
55. 322 So. 2d at 626. As to policy exclusions for injuries caused intentionally by the
insured, Florida courts distinguish between intentional acts and intentional injuries. Thus,
even if the act is intentional, it does not necessarily follow that the injury is intentional, as
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The District Court of Appeal, Third District, rejected this con-
tention and mechanically applied the exclusive pleading test. The
court reasoned that since the complaint alleged only a cause of ac-
tion for an intentional act, which was excluded from coverage, the
insurer would not be required to defend because it would not be
bound to indemnify.
This reasoning, as applied to the facts of Capoferri, is flawed.
As a general proposition, the duty to defend is considered distinct
from, and broader than, the duty to indemnify. Thus many courts
will require an insurer to defend if there is a "potential" of cover-
age arising from the alleged facts. Under this approach, actual cov-
erage need not be shown. In Capoferri, then, the court should have
found a duty to defend since the alleged facts certainly showed a
"potential" of coverage. One could reasonably surmise from the
complaint that the collision could have been due to Capoferri's
negligent driving.
Conversely, when the complaint contains no potential for cov-
erage, because it involves a claim which by its nature necessarily
and inexorably falls within an exclusion, then the insurer should
not have to defend. Thus, in Louisville Title Insurance Co. v.
Guerard," the complaint sought a prescriptive easement, which
the policy expressly excluded from coverage. The court properly
held that the insurer had no duty to defend, in that there was no
potential for coverage. The claim inescapably fell within the policy.
exclusion because the plaintiff could not recover on a lesser theory
or amend the complaint to allege a claim within coverage.
C. The "Exception" to the Exclusive Pleading Test
Although Florida courts generally follow the exclusive plead-
ing test, a few have looked beyond the complaint to the actual
facts in determining whether an insurer is obligated to defend.
Tennessee Corp. v. Lamb Brothers Construction Co.5 7 involved a
claim for damages resulting from the allegedly negligent operation
of a tractor during land clearing operations. An explosion inter-
intentional acts can result in unintended consequences. If the injury is not intended, the
exclusion will not absolve the insurer of its duty to indemnify. See, e.g., Phoenix Ins. Co. v.
Helton, 298 So. 2d 177 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974) (while intentionally driving into a crowd to
reach his wife, insured struck and broke a bystander's hand; although the act was inten-
tional, the injury was not).
56. 409 So. 2d 514 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982). For a more extensive discussion of the concept
of "potentiality," see infra notes 65, 120-21, 139-44 & 149 and accompanying text.
57. 265 So. 2d 533 (Fla. 2d DCA 1972).
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rupted the flow of natural gas to the plaintiff, Tennessee Corpora-
tion, forcing it to close its manufacturing plant.
Lamb Brothers, the insured, joined its insurer as a third-party
defendant, demanding indemnification and recovery of the costs of
defending the action. The insurance policy covered any injury or
destruction resulting from land clearing operations, but excluded
coverage if the damage occurred during land grading operations.
After the court concluded that the exclusion was not ambiguous, 58
it addressed the issue of the duty to defend. The court refused to
apply the general rule that the allegations of the complaint govern
the duty to defend,1 because the complaint failed to specify
whether the insured was performing land clearing or land grading
operations.60 Thus, the duty to defend was to depend on the actual
facts established on remand:
[S]ince the allegations in the complaint do not initially solve the
question posed in this case, we believe the responsibility vel non
to defend must now depend solely on the operation which, as-
suming causal connection, was in fact being performed at the
time of the accident. If that operation was grading, which is
within the exclusion, there was no duty to defend; if it was a
non-excluded aspect of land clearing then the insurance com-
pany declined to defend at its own risk, and it would now be
liable for the costs of such defense because under its contract it
should have defended. We now see the importance in this case
of making a determination of how and under what circum-
58. The trial court found no difference between land clearing and land grading; accord-
ingly, it refused to enforce the exclusion. The appellate court disagreed, noting that land
grading simply involves the leveling or contouring of land, while land clearing includes the
uprooting of trees and other vegetation, drainage operations, and sometimes land grading.
Id. at 537.
59. "[A] liability carrier must defend its insured if the initial pleadings fairly bring the
case within the scope of coverage even though, ultimately, there is no liability." Id. (empha-
sis added).
60. Id. at 538; cf. Lee v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 178 F.2d 750 (2d Cir. 1949) (involv-
ing the same fact pattern as Lamb Bros.). Since the complaint in Lee was ambiguous, the
court could not determine from the allegations whether the facts fell under the policy exclu-
sion-the "use" of an elevator. The court, however, resolved the issue in favor of the insured
and found a duty to defend:
[A]ny complaint, though its language may cover two or more events, is meant to
advise the defendant of only one event, unless two separate events create sepa-
rate liabilities. The "intended" event is that on which the injured party means to
rely; and, although he has not made it plain whether it is within the class of
events covered by the policy, it either is or is not within that class. His allegation
leaves its membership in that class open, but the class of the event he is talking




stances the accident in fact occurred .... "
Although the court in Lamb Brothers did not expressly refer
to any "exception" to the exclusive pleading test, it recognized, at
least implicitly, that an exception applies when the allegations are
inadequate to determine whether a duty to defend exists." In such
a case the court is not confined to the allegations in the complaint,
but may instead examine the objective facts to determine the de-
fense obligation. 8
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit simi-
larly applied the "exception" in Rowell v. Hodges.", In Rowell the
plaintiff's complaint alleged injuries caused by the insured in a car
accident, but the complaint did not specify the year and make of
the insured's car. The insurer learned through investigation that
the car involved in the accident was not the one covered by the
policy. The insured argued that the exclusive pleading test limited
the court to the allegations of the complaint and that the actual
facts which the insurer discovered were irrelevant. The insurer
maintained that the exclusive pleading test did not apply because
one could not ascertain from the complaint whether coverage ex-
isted; the duty to defend therefore depended on the actual facts.
The court agreed and held that under Florida law the insurer had
no duty to defend because the vehicle was not actually covered:
[T]o say here that the [insurer] must gauge its obligation strictly
by the pleading called a Complaint, and put blinders on, so to
speak, to what it actually knows and has definitely ascertained,
is somewhat archaic, considering the nature of our present sys-
tem of notice pleading. The Court simply cannot find any jusi or
logical reason why it should be held that the mere allegation by
61. 265 So. 2d at 538 (emphasis in original).
62. See infra text accompanying notes 158-96.
63. See also Florida Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Rice, 393 So. 2d 552 (Fla. 1st DCA
1980). In Rice a collision occurred between a motorcycle on which Rice was riding and a
Pontiac driven by the insured. Rice sued Eichholz, who notified his insurer, Farm Bureau.
Eichholz's policy expressly covered a pickup truck and "any automobile" unless owned by
the insured or available for his regular use. The complaint, of course, did not include infor-
mation that would establish coverage. When Eichholz first told Farm Bureau that his
mother-in-law owned the Pontiac, it denied coverage on the ground that the mother-in-law
was a member of Eichholz's household and the car was available for his regular use. Later,
however, Eichholz stated that his mother-in-law had given him the car just before she left
town and that the car had been inoperative until a day before the accident. Consequently,
the car was not furnished to him "for regular use." Based upon these facts, which Eichholz
later established at trial, the court held that the insurer had breached its duty to defend
and was liable for defense costs and the consent judgment entered against the insured.
64. 434 F.2d 926 (5th Cir. 1970).
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the Plaintiffs that [the insured] was operating "an automobile"
thereby invokes a contractual obligation to defend the suit by
the Plaintiffs, when reality, i.e., the actual identity of the vehicle
involved in the accident, told everybody that there was not and
never had been any insurance coverage .... 1
The Florida District Court of Appeal, Third District, has also
applied the "exception" in a case in which the complaint appar-
ently negated coverage, but instead contained a mistaken allega-
tion. In Tropical Park, Inc. v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty
Co.," the insured sued its insurer to recover costs incurred in the
insured's defense of a third party's complaint. The plaintiff, Mr.
Perez, claimed that he was injured while exercising a horse on the
insured's track. Perez alleged that he was a "free-lance jockey."
Based on that allegation, the insurer refused to defend because an
exclusionary provision in the insured's policy denied coverage for
injuries to jockeys. 7 At trial it was established that the plaintiff
was not a "free-lance jockey," as alleged, but rather an exercise boy
hired the day of the accident to gallop the horse."
The issue before the court in Tropical Park was whether a
duty to defend existed when the complaint was ambiguous as to
the applicability of an exclusion, but the actual facts triggered cov-
erage.69 The court ostensibly relied on the exclusive pleading test,
70
65. Id. at 930. But cf. Mol v. Holt, 86 Ill. App. 3d 838,.409 N.E.2d 20 (1980). In Holt the
plaintiffs sued the insured for injuries sustained in an automobile collision. The family in-
surance policy covered a Volkswagen and "additional owned vehicles," but required the in-
sured to notify the insurer of the purchase of any new automobiles. The complaint alleged
that the insured's car involved in the collision was a Camaro. The insurer declined defense
on the ground that the insured had not notified it of his ownership of the Camaro, thereby
breaching a condition of the policy. The court held that the insurer had breached its obliga-
tion to defend, notwithstanding the actual fact that the car was not covered, because the
complaint did not clearly allege facts which, if true, would exclude coverage. Thus, since
there was a "potentiality" of coverage, the duty to defend existed. Id. at 840-41, 409 N.E.2d
at 23; see also infra note 195.
66. 357 So. 2d 253 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978).
67. The provision excluded injuries to "any person while practicing for, or participating
in any contest, exhibition of an athletic or sports nature sponsored by the insured ... " Id.
at 255.
68. Id. at 256.
69. Cf. Capoferri v. Allstate Ins. Co., 322 So. 2d 625 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975) (rejecting the
insured's argument that an insurer cannot deny the existence of a duty to defend based on
bare allegations of an excluded event when the insurer's own investigation shows that the
allegations are groundless). See supra note 11 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
insurer's duty to defend regardless of its ultimate duty to indemnify.
70. "The original complaint.. . must allege facts which fairly bring the cause within
the coverage of the insurance contract even though ultimately there is no liability." 357 So.
2d at 256 (emphasis added).
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but found that the policy exclusion did not apply7' because the
actual facts showed that the plaintiff was an exercise boy, not a
jockey.72 The court reasoned that "the mistaken allegation in the
complaint that the claimant was a 'free-lance jockey' as opposed to
an exercise boy cannot reasonably be interpreted as placing the
claim within the exclusionary clause.
'78
Lamb Brothers, Rowell, and Tropical Park suggest that when
the insurer is relying on an exclusionary clause to avoid a duty to,
defend, and the allegations of the complaint are ambiguous or pa-
tently false, 4 the court may consider the actual facts, rather than
the pleadings, to determine coverage. The United States District
Court for the Northern District of Georgia, however, applying Flor-
ida law, extended the exception to a complaint that on its face ac-
tivated a policy exclusion, but also contained conclusory allega-
tions unsupported by the facts.
This extension of the exception occurred in Old Hickory Prod-
71. The court's reasoning on this point was rather interesting, if not fallacious. As an
initial premise, the court observed that the complaint alleged that the plaintiff was injured
while exercising a horse. Because the allegations did not contain the words used in the ex-
clusionary clause, "participating in" or "practicing for," the allegation of "exercising a
horse" did not activate the exclusion. One could argue, however, that when a jockey exer-
cises a horse, that person may also be practicing for a race. The two terms do not appear to
be mutually exclusive, until one adds the term "jockey" or "exercise boy." Thus, if a jockey
is exercising a horse, one may also consider him to be practicing for a race. If an exercise
boy is on the horse, however, then he is not practicing for a race. The key to the validity of
the court's first premise, then, depends on its second premise regarding the identity of the
rider.
In Tropical Park the court completely discarded the alleged identity of the rider as a
free-lance jockey and made its finding based on the fact that he was an exercise boy. This
finding, of course, is inconsistent with the exclusive pleading test. The court's conclusion,
then, although quite just, is based on two invalid premises and therefore is unsound.
72. See also Cotton States Mut. Ins. Co. v. Jacob, 379 So. 2d 129 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979).
73. 357 So. 2d at 257 (emphasis added). The holding in Tropical Park is not consistent
with the holding in Capoferri v. Allstate Ins. Co., 322 So. 2d 625 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975). In
both cases the issue was whether an insurer may refuse to defend based on the bare allega-
tions of an event that would exclude coverage. The allegations in both cases were demon-
strably false or groundless. In Capoferri the court held that an insurer need not defend,
presumably deriving its conclusion from a negative implication of the standard language:
The insurer will defend any suit alleging facts within coverage even if any of the allegations
are groundless, false, or fraudulent. Thus, the negative implication produces the principle
that the insurer need not defend any suit alleging facts within or an exclusion, even if the
allegations are groundless, false, or fraudulent. In Tropical Park the allegations of the exclu-
sion were "mistaken," i.e., false. Yet the court held that the insurer had a duty to defend.
74. See Burton v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 335 F.2d 317 (5th Cir. 1964) (apply-
ing Florida law). In dicta the court said, "knowledge by the Insurer that the wrong party has
been sued is not different from knowledge that the liability facts are different than alleged
in the third-party suits. Yet clearly in the latter instance the duty to defend is positive." Id.
at 323.
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ucts Co. v. Hickory Specialists, Inc.75 An insured instituted a
third-party action in a federal court against its insurer when the
latter refused to defend a suit that alleged several causes of ac-
tion,7 because every count contained allegations of intentional
acts." The insurer's refusal was based on an exclusionary clause
presumably 8 denying coverage for intentional acts. After conclud-
ing that Florida law applied," the United States District Court for
the Northern District of Georgia decided that it could not deter-
mine the insurer's duty to defend from the allegations in the com-
plaint. While the court recognized the "basic rule" in Florida, it
did not apply that rule because "[t]he allegation of bad faith and
wilfulness in connection with [the insured's] alleged deceptive ad-
vertising is wholly conclusory and unsupported by specific factual
allegations in the complaint."80
In rejecting the exclusive pleading test, the court maintained
that the rule originated from cases involving complaints8 that de-
tailed the facts relating to the duty to defend.8' The rule lost its
efficacy, however, with the advent of notice pleading in federal
courts. In addition, the court observed that the rule in Florida was
not absolute.88 Thus, on remand the existence of the insurer's duty
75. 366 F. Supp. 913 (N.D. Ga. 1973).
76. The causes of action included wrongful appropriation of trade secrets, interference
with contractual relations with an employee, and of particular relevance to the issue of the
duty to defend, unfair advertising and marketing. Id. at 914.
77. Id. at 923. "All of the foregoing acts of defendants have been and continue to be
committed wilfully, deliberately and in bad faith."
78. The court did not quote the language of the policy.
79. There was no question that Florida law governed the construction of the contract,
but the parties disagreed over whether the district court, sitting in Georgia, should apply
the duty to defend under Florida law, or under the Georgia state courts' likely interpreta-
tion of Florida law. Id. at 914-15. This issue seemed to be crucial because under Georgia law
the insurer had a duty to defend regardless of the pleaded allegations when the true facts
known to, or reasonably ascertainable by, the insurer afforded coverage. See Loftin v.
United States Fire Ins. Co., 106 Ga. App. 287, 127 S.E.2d 53 (1962). Florida law, however,
followed the exclusive pleading test, which states that the allegations of the complaint alone
govern the duty to defend.
80. 366 F. Supp. at 923.
81. Indeed, many argue that the test is anachronistic because it evolved under code
pleading, which required a detailed statement of the facts in the complaint to support the
cause of action. Under the present system of notice pleading, however, the complaint merely
serves a notice function, and with liberal rules of amendment, one cannot accurately predict
the nature of the plaintiff's recovery. See Babcock & Wilcox Co. v. Parsons Corp., 430 F.2d
531 (8th Cir. 1970).
82. See, e.g., Bennett v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 132 So. 2d 788, 789 (Fla. 1st DCA
1961).
83. Tennessee Corp. v. Lamb Bros. Constr. Co., 265 So. 2d 533 (Fla. 2d DCA 1972); see
supra notes 57-73 and accompanying text.
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to defend would depend on whether the actual facts showed cover-
age or an exclusion."4
D. The Exclusive Pleading Test: Is It the Sole Measure in
Florida?
Interestingly, in Hickory the federal district court predicted
that the Supreme Court of Florida would examine the objective
facts of the suit to determine whether coverage, and consequently
a duty to defend, existed.8 5 The court's prediction, however, may
have been incorrect. In National Union Fire Insurance Co. v.
Lenox Liquors, Inc.,86 the Supreme Court of Florida apparently87
reaffirmed Florida's adherence to the exclusive pleading test as the
sole method for determining a duty to defend. The Lenox liquor
store carried a standard liability policy covering injuries caused by
an "occurrence," defined as an accident resulting in injury that the
insured neither expected nor intended.8
In Lenox two boys who were carrying BB and pellet guns en-
tered the insured store. Rosen, the president of Lenox Liquors,
thought the youngsters were robbing the store and shot one of
them. The injured boy sued Lenox and Rosen, alleging that Rosen
In St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Icard, Merrill, Cullis & Timm, P.A., 196 So. 2d 219
(Fla. 2d DCA 1967), the insurer refused to defend a suit that a disgruntled client brought
against the insured law firm. The plaintiff wrote and signed the underlying complaint. It
contained unsupported conclusory allegations and accusations directed not only against the
firm and its members, but also against the entire Sarasota bar. The plaintiff alleged several
"theories," including conspiracy, but averred no supporting facts. The insured presented the
complaint to the insurer, who declined to defend because the policy excluded "dishonest,
fraudulent, criminal, or malicious" acts or omissions. The court held that the insurer had
unjustifiably relied on the complaint because it was "grossly insufficient in its averment of
facts, as distinguished from conclusions . . . ." Id. at 222.
The Hickory court's reliance on St. Paul for the principle that the actual facts con-
trolled the duty to defend seems erroneous. The basis for the court's holding in St. Paul was
not that the true facts indicated coverage; rather it was that the complaint contained allega-
tions partially within and outside coverage. Id. at 222-23; see supra note 39; see also Em-
ployers Commercial Union Ins. Co. of Am. v. Kottmeier, 323 So. 2d 605 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975).
In any event, St. Paul is of dubious precedential value in light of its unusual facts. Indeed,
the Fifth Circuit has recently stated that St. Paul should be confined to instances of "home-
drawn, pro se" complaints. ABC Distrib., Inc. v. Lumbermens Mut. Ins. Co., 646 F.2d 207,
209 (5th Cir. 1981).
84. The policy covered injuries caused by an "occurrence," defined as an accident
"neither expected nor intended by the insured." 366 F. Supp. at 923 (emphasis added). The
question at trial, then, would be whether the insured "expected" or "intended" the alleged
wrongful conduct.
85. 366 F. Supp. at 924.
86. 358 So. 2d 533 (Fla. 1977).
87. See infra notes 95-101 and accompanying text.
88. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
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"assaulted him by maliciously, willfully and wantonly firing a
loaded shotgun at him striking him in the back, thereby causing
grievous personal injury."8 9 When the insurer refused to defend,
the insured filed a third-party complaint demanding indemnifica-
tion for any adverse judgment. The trial court granted the in-
surer's motion to dismiss on the ground that the allegation of an
intentional injury obviated the insurer's duty to defend.90
The plaintiff and Lenox settled the underlying action and
stipulated that if they had tried the case, the plaintiff would have
proceeded on the theory that the insured's conduct was negligent,
not willful.91 On the basis of this stipulation, the insured instituted
an action to recover its costs of settlement and defense. The trial
court found that the claim fell within the "exception" to the exclu-
sive pleading test 92 because Rosen had acted unintentionally. The
District Court of Appeal, Third District, affirmed based on the in-
surer's participation in the stipulation."
In a terse opinion the Supreme Court of Florida applied the
exclusive pleading test' and found that since the complaint al-
leged an intentional act, no coverage and therefore no duty to de-
fend could exist. The question that immediately arises is whether
the court's holding means that in Florida the sole determinant of
the duty to defend is now the exclusive pleading test, or whether
under the unique facts of the case, the "exception" simply had no
application.In Federal Insurance Co. v. Applestein,a" the District Court of
Appeal, Third District, inferred a broad holding from Lenox and
89. 358 So. 2d at 533.
90. The judgment was without prejudice to the insured to amend its third-party com-
plaint if the plaintiff filed a subsequent action in which a covered event was alleged. Id. at
534.
91. Id.
92. See supra notes 57-84 and accompanying text. The Supreme Court of Florida de-
fined the exception to the rule as follows: "[A]n insurer is obligated to defend its insured
when the insurer knows or should reasonably be expected to know the facts which bring the
claim within the purview of the policy." 358 So. 2d at 534.
93. The Third District used this finding to distinguish Capoferri v. Allstate Ins. Co.,
322 So. 2d 625 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975), which also involved a complaint that on its face ex-
cluded coverage. See supra notes 51-56 and accompanying text. The Supreme Court of Flor-
ida rejected the distinction, because the insurer in Lenox merely had recited in the stipula-
tion that the other partie8 had agreed to the negligence theory. The insurer had not
participated. Thus, the court accepted certiorari because of the conflict between Lenox and
Capoferri. 358 So. 2d at 535.
94. "The allegations of the complaint govern the duty of the insurer to defend." Id. at
536. By implication the stipulation was immaterial.
95. 377 So. 2d 229 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979), cert. denied, 389 So. 2d 1107 (Fla. 1980).
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interpreted the decision to mandate the rejection of the exception
in favor of the exclusive pleading test.9 Because of the dubious
rationale employed in Applestein 7 and the Lenox court's failure
96. The "decision necessarily involves the supreme court's endorsement of the opposite
view that 'allegations, rather than known or ascertainable facts, determine [the] insurer's
duty to defend.'" Id. at 233 n.3. In Applestein the plaintiff brought suit against the in-
sureds, Mr. Applestein and the Applestein Foundation Trust. The plaintiff's fourth
amended complaint alleged libel, slander, and intentional infliction of emotional distress;
each allegation stated that the insured had acted with malice, bad faith, and reckless disre-
gard for the plaintiff's rights. The complaint also alleged that the foundation had ratified
and approved Applestein's acts.
Although the policy covered libel and slander, it excluded intentional acts; accordingly,
the insurer refused to defend. In the action for a declaratory judgment, the insured argued
that the actual facts elicited through discovery revealed that Applestein was not a "manag-
ing trustee" of the foundation and the foundation had not ratified or approved his acts.
Therefore, the liability of the insured was indeed covered. The court's reply was succinct:
"We need not consider whether this argument represents an accurate view of the record,
because the legal proposition upon which it is based is unsound." Id. at 232. After stating
what it believed to be the rule in Lenox, the Applestein court concluded: "Thus, the 'actual
facts' of the situation are not pertinent to the issues involved in the case before us." Id. at
233.
97. The Applestein court held that because the allegations of the complaint did not
trigger a duty to defend, the duty to indemnify did not exist either, notwithstanding that
the actual facts might have indicated coverage. The court's rationale was based on the ax-
iom that the duty to defend is broader than the duty to pay. Thus, when no duty to defend
arose from the allegations of the complaint, a fortiori, no duty to indemnify existed either.
Evidently, the court erred, however, because its conclusion stems from a non sequitur.
The duty to defend is considered to be distinct from, and broader than, the duty to pay.
The duty to defend is based on the allegations of the complaint, which may be either true or
false; the duty to pay is narrower because it always depends on the true facts established at
trial. See, e.g., Aetna Ins. Co. v. Waco Scaffold & Shoring Co., 370 So. 2d 1149, 1151 (Fla.
4th DCA 1978) ("[Tlhe fact that appellants had a duty to defend under these circumstances
does not necessarily mean that they were obligated to pay any judgment recovered. That
question is determined by the facts established at trial." (emphasis added)); see also supra
note 3.
The standard insurance policy language belies the Applestein court's conclusion. A
standard policy reads: "The company will pay on behalf of the insured all sums which the
insured shall become legally obligated to pay as damages because of
A. bodily injury or
B. property damages
to which this insurance applies, caused by an occurrence . 7C J. APPLEMAN, supra note
2, § 4682, at 22 n.9 (emphasis added). Manifestly, the insured does not become legally obli-
gated to pay from the mere allegations in the injured party's complaint, but rather becomes
obligated to pay only after trial and an adverse final judgment. Moreover, the language "to
which this insurance applies" necessarily involves a determination based on the actual facts
established at trial. Thus, with reference to the duty to pay, neither the insured nor the
insurer is subject to the vagaries of a third-party complaint over which they have no control.
As the Fifth Circuit, applying Texas law in Green v. Aetna Ins. Co., 349 F.2d 919 (5th
Cir. 1965), explained:
In articulating [the] standard for determining the duty to defend, Justice Hamil-
ton distinguishes the liability [between the duty to indemnify and defend
clauses]. With respect to payment of the claim, . . . the Court pointed out the
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to explicitly address the conflicting rules, one can argue that the
Lenox court merely decided that the exception did not apply to
the particular circumstances of the case.
The "exception" to the exclusive pleading test is more accu-
rately a "factual test" that requires the insurer to defend when the
alleged facts exclude coverage, but the unpleaded true facts known
to the insurer are within coverage."8 Thus, the exception necessar-
ily implies a variance between the false alleged facts and the un-
pleaded true facts. Without this variance, the exception does not
apply. The hiatus in the Applestein court's reasoning is that in
Lenox there were no "actual facts" diverging from those alleged in
the complaint. The supreme court specifically reviewed the stipula-
tion between the plaintiff and the insured and found that the set-
tlement was only between the parties to the principal action. Al-
though the insurer acknowledged the settlement, the
acknowledgment did not bind the insurer."9 In essence, the court
properly held 00 that because the insurer did not participate in the
"insurer does not pay because [the assured] is alleged to be legally responsible
but because [the assured] has been adjudicated to be legally responsible." 387
S.W.2d at 25. (Emphasis supplied). The Court highlights the contrast when it
goes on to state: "The coverage in [the duty to defend clause] is entirely differ-
ent from the coverage in [the duty to indemnify clause]. No legal determination
of ultimate liability is required before the insurer becomes obligated to defend
the suit. That paragraph has reference to a suit seeking to recover damages that
are covered in [the duty to indemnify clause]. * * * The coverage in [the duty
to defend clause] does not depend on what the facts are or what might finally be
determined to be the facts. It depends only on what the facts are alleged to be.
To put it simply, [the duty to indemnify clause] protects all [assureds] from
payment of damages they may be found legally obligated to pay under [that
clause]. [The duty to defend clause] protects the same parties against the ex-
pense of any suit seeking damages under [the duty to indemnify clause]." 387
S.W.2d at 25.
Id. at 924 (some brackets in original, some added).
Thus, contrary to the Applestein court's conclusion, the duty to defend is distinct from
the duty to indemnify. A determination from the complaint that there is no duty to defend
does not automatically lead to "the inevitable conclusion that there is [no duty to indemnify
against] an eventual judgment which may be entered upon that claim." 377 So. 2d at 233.
98. See supra note 92.
99. 358 So. 2d at 535. But cf. Shepard Maine Constr. Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co., 73
Mich. App. 62, 250 N.W.2d 541 (1976) (insurer who participated in stipulation which
brought claim within coverage had duty to defend, notwithstanding third-party complaint's
allegation of a completed operations exclusion).
100. The holding of the court was not only technically sound, but was also supported
by strong policy considerations. If the court had given effect to the stipulation, the decision
would promote collusion between plaintiffs and insureds. The case certainly did not present
the court with the "right" or "best" factual setting in which to apply the exception. But see
infra notes 125-56 and accompanying text.
Commentators have criticized the decision: "The insured believed he was properly de-
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agreement, and the parties did not proceed to trial, the "actual
facts" were never established. Accordingly, without any proof of
actual facts that conflicted with the complaint's allegations, the ex-
ception could not apply. If this reasoning is correct, then the fac-
tual test is still available in Florida. If, however, the Applestein
court's interpretation is correct, then the question remains whether
cases such as Hickory and Lamb Brothers are impliedly
overturned.101
V. AN "ExCEPTION" BECOMES A RULE: THE FACTUAL TEST
Courts that have deviated from the exclusive pleading test ad-
vance various reasons for adopting the "factual test."10 First, with
the advent of notice pleading in federal 08 and state courts,104 the
complaint may not contain sufficient facts to enable an insurer to
determine accurately whether a duty to defend exists.10e Under the
present pleading system, the complaint merely serves a notice
function, without truly informing the defendant of the nature or
extent of the plaintiff's claims. 106 Moreover, with the liberal rules
of amendment 1 and the toleration of variances between the evi-
fending himself. The insurer knew or should have known this. Both a duty to defend and a
duty to indemnify should have been found." 7C J. APPLEMAN, supra note 2, § 4685.01, at 20
n.15 (Supp. 1981).
101. Hickory must eventually be rejected because the complaint in that case alleged an
excluded event, as did the complaint in Lenox. Lamb Bros. is more questionable because it
could be distinguished on the ground that the complaint did not indicate whether the exclu-
sion applied or not.
102. These reasons will be developed in more detail, infra notes 103-14 and accompany-
ing text.
103. FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a): "A pleading which sets forth a claim for relief ... shall con-
tain ... (2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief ......
104. Florida courts have adopted notice pleading. C.A. Fielland v. Fidelity & Casualty
Co., 297 So. 2d 122 (Fla. 2d DCA 1974), cert. denied, 309 So. 2d 6 (Fla. 1975).
105. See, e.g., Ross Island Sand & Gravel Co. v. General Ins. Co., 472 F.2d 750 (9th Cir.
1973).
106. [P]laintiffs frequently elect to assert their claims in broad, general terms.
The parties then resort to interrogatories, requests for admissions, and the like,
to flesh out pretrial orders that will provide the trier of fact a simple statement
of the issues of law and fact remaining to be resolved in court. In such a pleading
environment, a complaint may or may not provide an insurance carrier with
enough information to permit an informed judgment on whether or not he must
defend.
Id. at 752.
107. FED. R. Civ. P. 15(a) states in part:
A party may amend his pleading once as a matter of course at any time before a
responsive pleading is served or, if the pleading is one to which no responsive
pleading is permitted and the action has not been placed upon the trial calendar,
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dence and the theory that the plaintiff posits, one can hardly con-
sider the complaint as an accurate indication of the basis of the
plaintiff's ultimate claims. In this pleading environment, then, ref-
erence to the complaint alone may lead to harsh and inequitable
results.
The second justification for adopting the factual test is the
plaintiff's propensity for overstating his claims. Even if an injury
results from negligence, a plaintiff may allege only an intentional
tort in order to support an award of punitive damages or increase
his chances of a favorable settlement. Since most, if not all, insur-
ance policies exclude coverage for intentional torts, insured parties
may be denied legal representation when in fact the claim is adju-
dicated to be within the policy coverage.
A third justification, closely related to the second, centers on
the insured's reasonable expectations."' 8 If the insured were to
state his belief as to what the duty to defend provision meant, he
would probably express an expectation that his insurer would de-
fend him whenever the complaint suggests the possibility of liabil-
ity based on facts within the policy's coverage. 10 9 Hence, if the in-
sured were sued for intentional assault and battery, which the
policy did not cover, and the insured had acted in self-defense, the
insured would reasonably expect the insurer to defend." 0
The courts that consider the insured's reasonable expectations
often view the insurance policy as an adhesion contract. Most of
the provisions of the policy-especially the duty to defend
he may so amend it at any time within 20 days after it is served. Otherwise a
party may amend his pleading only by leave of court or by written consent of the
adverse party; and leave shall be freely given when justice so requires.
108. Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co., 65 Cal. 2d 263, 419 P.2d 168, 54 Cal. Rptr. 104 (1966);
Comment, supra note 13.
109. Comment, supra note 13, at 748. The author argues persuasively that:
The insured probably would be surprised at the suggestion that defense coverage
might turn on the pleading rules of the court that a third party chose or on how
the third party's attorney decided to write the complaint. In some cases the in-
sured might think in terms of his own conduct. The bar owner, for example,
might well think that he is insulated from any legal expense arising from injuries
to patrons so long as he personally does not intentionally injure someone or tell
an employee to do so. To him the possibility of an ambitious claimant who
would begin a lawsuit with a charge of intentional injury for the sake of a
favorable bargaining position and later be willing to abandon that charge for one
of simple negligence might not occur; or if the possibility did occur the insured
might not pause to consider whether it would be fatal to part of his insurance
coverage.
Id.
110. Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co., 65 Cal. 2d 263, 419 P.2d 168, 54 Cal. Rptr. 104 (1966).
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clause-are standardized and not subject to meaningful negotia-
tion. The insured accepts the policy "as is," and has no real oppor-
tunity to bargain with another insurance company for more
favorable terms. Even if the duty to defend clause were subject to
negotiation,111 most negotiations would not benefit the insured be-
cause the parties probably could not agree on the appropriate test
to be applied in disparate factual settings. Therefore, because of
this adhesion contract setting, many courts tend to construe the
policy's provisions narrowly.
Closely related to an adhesion analysis is the contract princi-
ple of contra proferentem, under which ambiguous provisions in
an insurance policy are construed most strongly against the party
who selected the language-the insurer. 112 This principle is most
often employed in rejecting an exclusion that the court finds am-
biguous." s Since the court can apply the principle only when it
finds an ambiguous provision, however, the principle has a more
narrow scope than the adhesion contract analysis. '
VI. THE ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK: THE Two TESTS AS APPLIED
All of the above justifications favor the application of the fac-
tual test in determining whether a duty to defend exists. There
are, of course, countervailing considerations which support the
traditional rule, and which the factual test cannot supply: effi-
ciency, ease of application, and objectivity. Neither rule alone is
the complete panacea for both insureds and insurers. Rather, the
respective tests become appropriate or inappropriate depending on
the factual setting in which they are applied.
There are at least six conceptually distinct fact patterns 15
that may arise in establishing the duty to defend." It is necessary
111. To a layman, and even perhaps to an attorney unfamiliar with insurance practice,
the duty to defend clause appears rather innocuous. Yet, the extensive litigation over the
meaning of the clause belies the appearance of simplicity. See Comment, supra note 13, at
734.
112. See, e.g., Lee v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 178 F.2d 750 (2d Cir. 1949).
113. See, e.g., Lowell v. Maryland Casualty Co., 65 Cal. 2d 298, 419 P.2d 180, 54 Cal.
Rptr. 116 (1966).
114. See Note, Liability Insurer's Duty to Defend: American Policyholders' Ins. Co. v.
Cumberland Cold Storage Co., 30 ME. L. REv. 295, 302 (1979).
115. For purposes of analysis, this author has omitted the factual possibility that a
complaint may contain facts partially within and partially outside coverage. Almost all juris-
dictions agree that when a defendant tenders this type of complaint, the insurer must de-
fend the entire suit, at least until the parties narrow the claim to a noncovered event. See
supra note 39.
116. See Dahoney, supra note 13, at 456. The author identifies four categories of allega-
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to examine each fact pattern to determine which test is more ap-
propriate under the circumstances. These patterns are:
(1) The allegations of the complaint and the extraneous facts
indicate coverage under the applicable policy provisions.
(2) The allegations of the complaint indicate the applicability of
an intentional injury exclusionary provision.
(3) The allegations against the insured are unclear, conclusory,
or ambiguous as to coverage; the unpleaded actual facts indi-
cate, or are compatible with coverage.
(4) The allegations are unclear, conclusory, or ambiguous as to
coverage; the unpleaded actual facts indicate noncoverage or the
applicability of an exclusion.
(5) The allegations and the actual facts conflict. The allegations
indicate a policy exclusion; the actual facts indicate coverage or
a potential for coverage.
(6) The allegations and the actual facts conflict. The allegations
trigger coverage; the actual facts activate an exclusion or show
noncoverage.
A. SITUATION 1: The allegations of the complaint and the
extraneous facts indicate coverage under the applicable policy
provisions.
The first factual setting presents the strongest case for the ap-
plication of the exclusive pleading test. In this situation courts uni-
formly hold that if the complaint indicates coverage, the insurer
must defend, 1 7 irrespective of the veracity of the allegations. The
only difference among the various courts involves the standard of
interpretation used when the pleadings are compared to the cover-
tions that have posed problems for the judiciary and suggests how courts would resolve each
one under Texas law. The four categories include: (1) a complaint containing allegations
clearly within or clearly outside coverage; (2) a complaint containing allegations partially
within and partially without coverage; (3) a complaint containing ambiguous or general alle-
gations; (4) a complaint containing allegations that conflict with the known or ascertainable
facts.
In identifying these categories, the author does not distinguish between a complaint
with conclusory allegations in which the unpleaded actual facts indicate coverage and one
with conclusory allegations in which the unpleaded actual facts indicate noncoverage or an
exclusion. Similarly, the author fails to distinguish between a complaint containing a vari-
ance between the actual and alleged facts when the actual facts indicate coverage and one
containing a variance between the actual and alleged facts when the actual facts indicate an
exclusion. As this article points out, infra, many courts will distinguish between these cate-
gories of allegations in applying different tests for determining the obligation to defend.
117. Courts under this factual setting apply the "comparison test," matching the com-
plaint with the policy provisions to ascertain whether the claimed injury is within the pol-
icy's coverage. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
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age provisions of the insurance policy. Thus, if the complaint con-
tains facts which fairly,118 arguably, 11' or potentially'" fall within
the policy's coverage, the insurer must defend. 2'
The exclusive pleading test is applied in this factual setting
because of the language of the insurance policy: "[T]he company
shall defend any suit alleging [a covered risk] and seeking damages
which are payable under the terms of this policy, even if any of the
allegations of the suit are groundless, false or fraudulent. .. .
Under the first factual setting, the insurer must defend because it
has expressly obligated itself to defend against alleged covered
risks, even if groundless, false, or fraudulent. Thus, because the
contractual language of the obligation to defend explicitly covers
the first factual setting, the contract is dispositive of the rights of
the parties. 28 This conclusion, that the exclusive pleading test ap-
plies when the complaint and facts both trigger coverage, is
well-settled in American jurisprudence. 1 4
118. See, e.g., Accredited Bond Agencies, Inc. v. Gulf Ins. Co., 352 So. 2d 1252, 1253
(Fla. 1st DCA 1977).
119. See, e.g., Carolina Aircraft Corp. v. American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 517 F.2d 1076,
1077 (5th Cir. 1975) (applying Florida law).
120. See, e.g., Travelers Indem. Co. v. Dingwell, 414 A.2d 220 (Me. 1980):
Whether [the insured] can obtain a defense from his insurer must depend not on
the caprice of the plaintiff's draftmanship, nor the limits of his knowledge, but.
on a potential shown in the complaint that the facts ultimately proved may
come within the coverage. Even a complaint which is legally insufficient to with-
stand a motion to dismiss gives rise to a duty to defend if it shows an intent to
state a claim within the insurance coverage.
Id. at 226 (emphasis in original).
121. Although at first glance these three standards appear similar, their use can actu-
ally lead to quite disparate results. Generally, "potential" coverage is broader than "fairly
within coverage." The use of "arguably" or "potentially" can result in an otherwise excluded
event being considered within coverage. For instance, some courts when confronted with a
complaint alleging an intentional tort will hold that the excluded event is "arguably" or
"potentially" within coverage, because the injured party may only succeed in proving a neg-
ligent (as opposed to intentional) act. See, e.g., Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co., 65 Cal. 2d 263, 419
P.2d 168, 54 Cal. Rptr. 104 (1966). It appears that such a broad construction of the plain-
tiff's complaint will trigger a duty to defend whenever the alleged event is excluded, render-
ing nugatory the effect of exclusionary provisions. One commentator has aptly characterized
this approach as making the insurer's duty to defend absolute. See Note, The Insurer's
Duty to Defend Made Absolute: Gray v. Zurich, 14 U.C.L.A. L. Rv. 1328 (1967). See gener-
ally infra notes 130-44 and accompanying text.
122. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
123. Significantly, the language of the contract is dispositive only under the first and
sixth factual settings. The language only purports to cover a situation in which the allega-
tions trigger coverage.
124. See, e.g., Shaw v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 407 F.2d 813 (7th Cir. 1969) (inter-
preting Illinois law); Green v. Aetna Ins. Co., 349 F.2d 919 (5th Cir. 1965) (applying Texas
law); Lee v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 178 F.2d 750 (2d Cir. 1949) (dictum); Oliver B.
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B. SITUATION 2: The allegations of the complaint indicate the
applicability of an intentional injury exclusionary provision.1"
Is there an automatic duty to defend?
When the complaint against the insured alleges an intentional
injury that is expressly excluded from coverage under the policy,
one would expect that a duty to defend could not arise. Presuma-
bly, the coverage provisions of the policy circumscribe the duty to
defend. Yet, a growing minority of courts hold either that the alle-
gation of an intentional injury suffices to trigger a duty to defend,
or the allegations do not conclusively determine whether a duty to
defend exists."2
The courts which hold that the mere allegation of an excluded
or noncovered event precludes an insurer's duty to defend base
their conclusion on the exclusive pleading test, with many relying
on the policy's language: The company will defend any suit alleg-
ing a covered event, even if the allegations are groundless, false, or
fraudulent. 12 7 This clause, however, is couched in positive terms
and explicitly covers a situation in which the allegations include
facts within coverage. The courts that rely on the exclusive plead-
ing test when the allegations indicate a policy exclusion or noncov-
erage predicate their position on a negative implication of the posi-
tive policy language regarding the duty to defend the insured.3 8
Cannon & Son v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 484 F. Supp. 1375 (D. Del. 1980) (applying Penn-
sylvania law); Travelers Indem. Co. v. Dingwell, 414 A.2d 220 (Me. 1980); Atcheson v. Safeco
Ins. Co., 165 Mont. 239, 527 P.2d 549 (1974); Hastings v. Royal-Globe Ins. Co., 521 S.W.2d
869 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975). See generally Annot., 50 A.L.R.2D 458 (1956).
125. An example of an intentional injury exclusion is a claim of assault and battery.
126. For a further discussion of these cases, see infra text accompanying notes 147-51,
155-56.
127. See, e.g., Carolina Aircraft Corp. v. American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 517 F.2d 1076
(5th Cir. 1975) (applying Florida law); Scherschlight v. Empire Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 494
F. Supp. 936 (S.D.S.D. 1980) (applying Nebraska law); Ladner & Co. v. Southern Guar. Ins.
Co., 347 So. 2d 100 (Ala. 1977); Pauline v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 1 Ariz. App. 408, 403
P.2d 555 (1965); Kyllo v. Northland Chem. Co., 209 N.W.2d 629 (N.D. 1973); Isenhart v.
General Casualty Co. of Am., 233 Or. 49, 377 P.2d 26 (1962); McDonald v. United Pac. Ins.
Co., 210 Or. 895, 311 P.2d 425 (1957); Amundsen v. Great Cent. Ins. Co., 451 S.W.2d 277
(Tex. Civ. App. 1970); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Newson, 352 S.W.2d 888 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961)
(finding that no duty existed based on allegations of assault and battery, even though no
assault took place).
128. See supra notes 54 & 73 and accompanying text.
Although this principle is usually invoked to compel an insurance company to
defend an action in which the allegations of the complaint bring it within the
coverage of the policy, regardless of the ultimate outcome of the action or the
liability of the insured, yet, there is no logical reason not to apply it conversely;
that is, in those cases in which the allegations of the complaint do not bring the
action within the coverage of the policy.
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Some recent decisions question whether the application of the
exclusive pleading test is warranted when the complaint seemingly
excludes coverage but the allegations are either groundless or over-
stated.1 s2 The majority of these cases reject the argument that be-
cause the contract obligates an insurer to defend an alleged cov-
ered risk, therefore, the converse proposition that the insurer need
not defend an alleged noncovered or excluded risk must be true.
Although this argument follows logically, courts have evaded it
under a number of different theories.
One of the most persuasive and comprehensive opinions repre-
senting the trend of authority is that of the Supreme Court of Cali-
fornia in Gray v. Zurich Insurance Co.150 Dr. Gray, the insured,
sued his insurer to recover costs incurred in defending a lawsuit
that alleged he had committed an assault.131 The insurer refused to
defend the suit because of an exclusionary provision in the policy
denying coverage for injuries "caused intentionally by or at the di-
rection of the insured.""' Gray, however, claimed that he had
acted in self-defense. At trial his defense was unavailing. 18 The
issue in the subsequent action against the insurer was whether the
insurer had a duty to defend a complaint against its insured that
alleged an excluded intentional injury.1"
The court held that the insurer had a duty to defend on alter-
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Coriell, 30 Ohio Misc. 67, 72-73, 284 N.E.2d 202, 206 (C.P. Scioto County
1971).
129. Solo Cup Co. v. Federal Ins. Co., 619 F.2d 1178 (7th Cir. 1980); Lowell v. Maryland
Casualty Co., 65 Cal. 2d 298, 419 P.2d 180, 54 Cal. Rptr. 116 (1966); Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co.,
65 Cal. 2d 263, 419 P.2d 168, 54 Cal. Rptr. 104 (1966); Firco, Inc. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co.,
173 Cal. App. 2d 524, 343 P.2d 311 (1959); Raday v. Board of Educ., 130 N.J. Super. 552,
328 A.2d 17 (App. Div. 1974). Contra St. Paul Ins. Co. v. Talladega Nursing Home, 606 F.2d
631 (5th Cir. 1980) (applying Alabama law, court concluded that insurer had no duty to
defend complaint alleging series of intentional injury exclusions, despite insured's claim that
allegations were groundless and overstated); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Coriell, 30 Ohio Misc. 67,
284 N.E.2d 202 (C.P. Scioto County 1971); Angelone v. Union Mut. Ins. Co., 113 R.I. 230,
319 A.2d 344 (1974); Brisco v. Travelers Indem. Co., 18 Wash. App. 662, 571 P.2d 226
(1977).
130. 65 Cal. 2d 263, 419 P.2d 168, 54 Cal. Rptr. 104 (1966).
131. The incident which gave rise to the underlying suit was as follows: The insured
driver, Dr. Gray, narrowly missed colliding with another car. The other driver, Jones, ap-
proached Gray in a menacing manner and jerked the car door open. Gray, fearing personal
injury, ended the altercation by punching Jones. Id. at 267 n.1, 419 P.2d at 170 n.1, 54 Cal..
Rptr. at 106 n.1.
132. Id. at 267, 419 P.2d at 170, 54 Cal. Rptr. at 106.
133. The judgment awarded Jones $61,000 actual damages, but did not award punitive
damages.
134. Significantly, the actual facts did not diverge from the alleged facts. For a discus-
sion of this fact situation, see infra text accompanying notes 197-264.
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native grounds.138 First, the court found the duty to defend under
the policy to be a primary duty, and the exclusionary provision
under which the insurer sought to avoid the duty unclear and in-
conspicuous.18 6 Since the insured reasonably expected his insurer
to defend this type of suit, the insurer had a duty to defend. 7 The
court suggested that the exclusionary provision was ambiguous be-
cause the policy could still cover intentional acts resulting in unin-
tended harm.188
As an alternative ground for its holding on the insurer's duty
to defend, the court accepted, for purposes of argument, the in-
surer's premise that the third-party complaint should define the
insurer's duty to defend. Nonetheless, the court believed that after
applying the exclusive pleading test, the insurer's duty to defend
would be present if a suit was "potentially" within the policy's cov-
erage. The court concluded that the claim against Gray was poten-
tially within coverage, based on the following reasoning:
Jones' complaint clearly presented the possibility that he
might obtain damages that were covered by the indemnity pro-
visions of the policy. Even conduct that is traditionally classified
as "intentional" or "wilful" has been held to fall within indem-
nification coverage. Moreover, despite Jones' pleading of inten-
tional and wilful conduct, he could have amended his complaint
to allege merely negligent conduct. Further, plaintiff might have
been able to show that in physically defending himself, even if
he exceeded the reasonable bounds of self-defense, he did not
commit wilful and intended injury, but engaged only in
nonintentional tortious conduct.[1 13 Thus, even accepting the
135. 65 Cal. 2d at 268, 419 P.2d at 171, 54 Cal. Rptr. at 107.
136. The court believed that the clause was unclear because the nature of its relation-
ship to the basic promise requiring the insurer to defend a suit alleging bodily injury was
obscure. Consequently, the court stated, "the basic promise would support the insured's
reasonable expectation that he had bought the rendition of legal services to defend against a
suit for bodily injury which alleged he had caused it, negligently, nonintentionally, inten-
tionally or in any other manner." 65 Cal. 2d at 273, 419 P.2d at 174, 54 Cal. Rptr. at 110.
Thus, the court necessarily interpreted the following language as not including any reference
to exclusionary provisions: "[T]he company shall defend any suit ... alleging such bodily
injury or property damage and seeking damages which are payable under the terms of this
endorsement . . . ." Id. at 267, 419 P.2d at 170, 54 Cal. Rptr. at 106 (emphasis added).
Although this is a strained view of the clause, the court supported its argument by finding
that the exclusionary provision was not conspicuous. See Comment, supra note 13.
137. 65 Cal. 2d at 268-75, 419 P.2d at 171-75, 54 Cal. Rptr. at 107-11; see supra notes
108-10 and accompanying text.
138. Accord Lawler Mach. & Foundry Co. v. Pacific Indem. Ins. Co., 383 So. 2d 156
(Ala. 1980); McGroarty v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 36 N.Y.2d 358, 329 N.E.2d 172, 36 N.Y.S.2d
485 (1975).
139. But see Briscoe v. Travelers Indem. Co., 18 Wash. App. 662, 571 P.2d 226 (1971).
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insurer's premise that it had no obligation to defend ac-
tions seeking damages not within the indemnification cov-
erage, we find, upon proper measurement of the third
party action against the insurer's liability to indemnify, it
should have defended because the loss could have fallen
within that liability. "4
The court observed that the potential of coverage was even
more evident because of a plaintiff's penchant for "draft[ing] its
complaint in the broadest terms."' Thus, even though an act may
be negligent, or at least unintentional, a plaintiff may allege an in-
tentional act to enhance settlement prospects or provide for the
recovery of punitive damages.14 2 Since the court under the exclu-
sive pleading test may only look to the pleadings, which may be
deliberately overstated and inaccurate, a stranger over whom the
insured has no control would determine the insured's right to a
defense. The court rejected this result: "In light of the likely over-
statement of the complaint and of the plasticity of modern plead-
ing, we should hardly designate the third party as the arbiter of
the policy's coverage.
In Briscoe the complaint alleged an intentional tort of assault and battery. The insured
argued that intentional acts resulting in unintended consequences fall within the policy defi-
nition of "accident," and therefore the insurer should have defended, especially when the
insured acted in self-defense. The court disagreed, quoting with approval Hartford Accident
& Indem. Co. v. Krekeler, 363 F. Supp. 354, 357-58 (E.D. Mo. 1973), rev'd on other grounds,
419 F.2d 884 (8th Cir. 1974):
Krekeler argues that, while he may have intentionally struck Donato, he did
so in self-defense not intending to physically injure him. Assuming that
Krekeler's defense of self-defense overcomes Donato's claim, it is inescapable
that Krekeler intended the movement of his own arm, the clenching of his fist,
and the forceful contact between his fist and Donato's body. It belies reason to
say that he did not intend to physically injure Donato. Why else the contact
between fist and nose?
18 Wash. App. at 667, 571 P.2d at 229.
140. 65 Cal. 2d at 277, 419 P.2d at 177, 54 Cal. Rptr. at 113.
141. Id. at 276, 419 P.2d at 176, 54 Cal. Rptr. at 112.
142. See supra notes 47-50 and accompanying text.
143. 65 Cal. 2d at 276, 419 P.2d at 176, 54 Cal. Rptr. at 112; see also Firco, Inc. v.
Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 173 Cal. App. 2d 524, 343 P.2d 311 (1959). In Firco the insured
sought declaratory relief against its insurer, who refused to defend against an action for
wrongful removal of timber. The insurer argued that the refusal was justified because the
complaint alleged an intentional tort beyond the policy's coverage. The court rejected the
insurer's position, holding that since the insured's entry might be deemed unintentional,
and thus within the policy's coverage, the insurer must defend, at least until the claim was
undeniably confined to a noncovered event. The court analogized the case to Lee v. Aetna
Casualty & Sur. Co., 178 F.2d 750 (2d Cir. 1949) (doubt resolved in favor of insured), ex-
plaining that the claim may, or may not, be within coverage. In any event, the allegations,
which excluded coverage, could not conclusively control the duty to defend.
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Current procedural rules shaped the court's view of the exclu-
sive pleading test:
[The insurer] cannot construct a formal fortress of the third
party's pleadings and retreat behind its walls. The pleadings are
malleable, changeable, and amendable.
Since modern procedural rules focus on the facts of a case
rather than the theory of recovery in the complaint, the duty to
defend should be fixed by the facts which the insurer learns
from the complaint, the insured, or other sources. An insurer,
therefore, bears a duty to defend its insured whenever it ascer-
tains facts which give rise to the potential of liability under the
policy.
144
Gray v. Zurich Insurance Co. therefore establishes that the in-
surer must defend complaints alleging intentional injuries because
these allegations inherently carry the potential for recovery under
alternative theories of negligence. This principle applies despite
the possibility that the claim and the plaintiff's judgment will fall
outside the duty to indemnify.
Although one commentator has criticized the Gray holding,1"
several courts have followed Gray's lead when faced with a com-
plaint that expressly excludes coverage." Some courts1 47 temper
144. 64 Cal. 2d at 276, 419 P.2d at 176-77, 54 Cal. Rptr. at 112; see also Solo Cup Co. v.
Federal Ins. Co., 619 F.2d 1178 (7th Cir. 1980). In Solo Cup one of Solo's employees filed a
formal charge against the company with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
("EEOC"). The EEOC, in turn, brought an action against the insured, alleging intentional
employment discrimination. The insurer refused to defend because the policy only covered
"occurrences," which the policy defined as an unintentional accident. The insured then set-
tled with the employee and sought to recoup its costs incurred in defending the action from
the insurer. The court held that although the complaint alleged an intentional injury, the
insurer had to defend. The court reasoned that the plaintiff could have proved an EEOC
violation on two distinct grounds: disparate treatment or disparate impact. Because the lat-
ter does not require the plaintiff to prove intent, the complaint contained a possibility of
coverage which triggered a duty to defend. But see American Home Assurance Co. v. Dia-
mond Tours & Travel, 78 A.D.2d 801, 433 N.Y.S.2d 116 (1980) (insurer had no duty to
defend complaint alleging policy exclusions of fraud and willful misrepresentation even
though insured might have been liable for only negligent misrepresentation within policy's
coverage), rev'g 103 Misc. 2d 733, 426 N.Y.S.2d 897 (Sup. Ct.).
145. Note, supra note 121.
146. See, e.g., Conner v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 496 P.2d 770 (Okla. 1972):
It is certainly not consonant with the objects to be accomplished by a profes-
sional insurance policy to say that by its terms no protection is afforded the
insured when groundless charges of fraud and dishonesty are alleged in a suit
against him. This must be so unless the exclusionary clause covers groundless,
false and fraudulent charges by express reference.
Id. at 775 (emphasis added).
147. See, e.g., Raday v. Board of Educ., 130 N.J. Super. 552, 328 A.2d 17 (App. Div.
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the Gray result by holding that if the complaint alleges an ex-
cluded intentional injury, and the underlying tort litigation will
not necessarily decide the question of coverage,1 4 8 then mere exam-
ination of the third-party complaint cannot determine the duty to
defend. In these cases the actual facts will govern the duty to de-
fend. Other courts conclude that if the complaint, without amend-
ment, can impose liability for conduct the policy covers, the in-
surer is put on notice of the possibility of coverage and must
defend despite the allegations of an excluded event.
1 4'
Although their reasoning differs, these cases all share a com-
mon theme: If the complaint alleges an intentional injury exclu-
sion, the insurer cannot simply rely upon the exclusive pleading
test to avoid a defense obligation. Instead, courts hold that the in-
surer must either defend notwithstanding allegations of acts not
covered by the policy,1 0 or only if the proven actual facts indicate
the inapplicability of a policy exclusion.1' 1
Although the Gray decision supporting the former view is gen-
erally well-reasoned, it is too expansive in that the insurer must
defend a complaint against the insured when any possibility of
coverage exists. This means that an insurer must defend virtually
1974).
148. Id. at 556, 328 A.2d at 19. In Raday the insured brought a third-party complaint
against its insurer who had refused to defend against the underlying claim of assault and
battery. The tort trial ended in favor of the insured, but the trial judge ordered a new trial.
The insured then moved for a declaratory judgment to recover its costs of defense for the
main action.
The Superior Court of New Jersey noted that the underlying trial jould not necessarily
resolve the question of coverage. The court held that under these circumstances the actual
facts, rather than the allegations of the complaint, would govern the duty to defend. On
remand the actual facts would be established in the tort trial by submitting written inter-
rogatories to the jury. Id. at 557, 328 A.2d at 20.
149. Farris v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 273 Or. 628, 542 P.2d 1031 (1975).
The complaint alleged that the insureds, as well as their servants and agents, committed
tortious acts, and that the insureds directed and ratified the acts. Since the plaintiff could
have recovered on a theory of respondeat superior without proving that the insureds di-
rected the acts of their agents (i.e., the plaintiff could have recovered on a covered claim
without amending the complaint), the insurer owed a duty to defend.
See also Ferguson v. Birmingham Fire Ins. Co., 254 Or. 496, 460 P.2d 342 (1968) (alle-
gation of willful trespass against insured triggered duty to defend, despite policy exclusion,
because plaintiff could have recovered for nonwillful entry without amending his com-
plaint); Parker v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 222 Va. 33, 278 S.E.2d 803 (1981) (complaint al-
leged intentional trespass; insured had duty to defend because the pleadings, without
amendment, could have supported judgment for unintentional trespass). But see Argonaut
Southwest Ins. Co. v. Maupin, 485 S.W.2d 291 (Tex. Civ. App. 1972) (allegation of trespass
within exclusion; therefore, no duty to defend existed).
150. This was the holding in Gray. See supra nktes 130-45 and accompanying text.
151. Raday v. Board of Educ., 130 N.J. Super. 552, 328 A.2d 17 (App. Div. 1974).
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every suit against the insured'5 2 because of the chance that the
plaintiff, for example, will amend his complaint to include a cov-
ered injury. Moreover, even if an intentional act is proved, appar-
ently negating coverage, a finding of an unintended result may
still bring the claim within the policy's coverage."'3 The effect of
the Gray holding that the insurer must defend a complaint alleging
assault and battery, even though the actual facts conform to the
allegations, is to eliminate the intentional injury exclusion from
the resolution of the duty to defend issue. The exclusionary provi-
sion, according to Gray, will only affect the question of
indemnity."15
Perhaps the better view is that of the Supreme Court of New
Jersey.13 5 If the complaint alleges an intentional injury excluded
from a policy's coverage, such as assault and battery, and the tort
trial will not necessarily determine the question of coverage, the
allegations should not determine the existence of a duty to defend.
Instead, under these circumstances the established actual facts will
govern the defense obligation. The rationale is that an allegation of
an intentional injury is simultaneously within and excluded from
coverage:
* * * The exclusion of intentional injury is somewhat unique
with respect to the problem of coverage. The usual coverage is-
sue depends upon status, time, place, identity of the instrumen-
tality, and the like. But in the case of the exclusion of inten-
tional injuries, the injuries, which otherwise are within the
coverage, are excepted therefrom because of a state of mind, and
indeed a state of mind which the injured claimant may but need
152. The Gray court suggested two situations in which the insurer need not defend:
when "the policy was not in force at the time of the alleged occurrence [and] if the nature of
the alleged intentional tort compels a finding of intentional wrongdoing such as malicious
prosecution." 65 Cal. 2d at 276 n.15, 419 P.2d at 176 n.15, 54 Cal. Rptr. at 112 n.15; see
Note, supra note 121, at 1330.
153. See supra note 55.
154. The Gray court's conclusion that the exclusionary provision does not affect the
extent of the duty to defend clause is anathema to the policy language: "[The company
shall defend any suit against the insured alleging such bodily injury or property damage and
seeking damages which are payable under the terms of this endorsement, even if any of the
allegations are groundless, false or fraudulent. . . ." 65 Cal. 2d at 267, 419 P.2d at 170, 54
Cal. Rptr. at 106 (emphasis added). The language used clearly qualifies the types of claims
the insurer expects to defend as those that would be payable under the indemnity provi-
sions of the policy. The court rejected this argument by ignoring the phrase "which are
payable under the terms of this endorsement." But cf. Steyer v. Westvaco Corp., 450 F.
Supp. 384, 389 (D. Md. 1978) (both duty to defend and duty to pay depend on scope of
coverage underlying policy).
155. Raday v. Board of Educ., 130 N.J. Super. 552, 328 A.2d 17 (App. Div. 1974).
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not allege or prove, to prevail against the insured. Since a claim-
ant who charges intentional injury may thus recover even
though the intent to injure is not proved, his complaint, on its
face, is simultaneously within both the basic covenant to pay
and the intentional injury exclusion from that coverage'"
In summary, when the complaint alleges an intentional injury
exclusion, the insurer under the various modern approaches would
not be able to use the exclusive pleading test to "construct a for-
mal fortress" of the third-party complaint."17 Several factors mili-
tate against the application of the exclusive pleading test in this
context: (1) the plaintiff's tendency to overstate his claim; (2) the
liberal rules of amendment; (3) intentional acts may result in only
unintended consequences that may still be within coverage; and (4)
the realization that allegations of an intentional injury are simulta-
neously within and outside the coverage provisions of the policy. If
the allegations are not determinative, the actual facts established
at trial would govern the existence of the duty to defend. If, then,
the underlying trial results in a jury verdict for the insured, or the
plaintiff changes his theory to negligence, the duty to defend at-
taches. If, however, the jury finds for the injured party, then it
should also determine, and indicate by written interrogatories,
whether the act resulted in an intended injury. Accordingly, the
insurer would only pay for what it has promised.
C. SITUATION 3: The allegations against the insured are
unclear, conclusory, or ambiguous as to coverage; the unpleaded
actual facts indicate, or are compatible with coverage.
As discussed earlier, the exclusive pleading test requires the
insurer to compare the third-party complaint to the policy, and if
any of the claims are within, or potentially within coverage, the
insurer must defend the insured. Suppose the complaint inade-
quately describes the nature of the claim so that the insurer cannot
in good faith determine whether coverage exists. May the insurer
safely rely on the exclusive pleading test and conclude that since
the complaint does not state a claim within coverage, there is no
duty to defend? Suppose the insurer knows or could reasonably
ascertain facts that would indicate coverage. Should the insurer as-
sume a duty to defend, or simply disregard these facts and dis-
156. Id. at 556, 328 A.2d at 19 (emphasis added) (quoting Burd v. Sussex Ins. Co., 56
N.J. 383, 388, 267 A.2d 7, 12 (1970)).
157. See supra note 144.
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claim coverage? These questions indicate one of the major flaws in
the exclusive pleading test. The test evolved when pleading rules
required detailed factual complaints. Indeed, the exclusive plead-
ing test is based on, and even presupposes, the existence of de-
tailed factual pleadings that would clarify whether coverage exists
or not. These underlying assumptions are no longer true under no-
tice pleading.
Frequently, a modern complaint does not adequately describe
facts concerning coverage. This is attributable to two causes. First,
the injured party usually is not aware of the terms of the defen-
dant's insurance policy; its complaint therefore may not include
facts that would be essential to a determination of coverage. ' For
instance, if a plaintiff sues an insured for injuries resulting from an
automobile accident, the plaintiff's complaint might not indicate
the make and year of the insured's car.1 "9 Or if a plaintiff's prop-
erty is damaged owing to an insured's business operations, the
plaintiff could certainly state a cause of action without indicating
which of the defendant's business operations was involved. " In
short, a plaintiff's ability to state a cause of action is not depen-
dent upon a statement of facts pertinent to coverage under the de-
fendant's insurance policy; indeed, facts central to the coverage is-
sue may not be germane to the underlying tort trial. 6 '
The second, closely related reason is that notice pleading only
requires the plaintiff to provide a summary statement of his
claim. " In this pleading environment, the plaintiff may choose to
plead only those matters essential to state a cause of action that
will survive a motion to dismiss, and await discovery to uncover
other facts relevant to the claim.' as Accordingly, the complaint
may not fairly apprise the insured or its insurer whether either
coverage or an exclusion exists.16
158. A plaintiff's attorney should learn all he can about the existence of any insurance
policies, and then draft his complaint so as to include, if possible, a cause of action within
coverage. Then, if the plaintiff obtains a judgment against the insured, the plaintiff, as as-
signee, can recover attorney's fees for the insurer's wrongful refusal to defend.
159. See Rowell v. Hodges, 434 F.2d 926 (5th Cir. 1970); supra notes 64-65 and accom-
panying text.
160. See Tennessee Corp. v. Lamb Bros. Constr. Co., 265 So. 2d 533 (Fla. 2d DCA
1972); supra notes 57-65 and accompanying text.
161. See, e.g., New Hampshire Ins. Co. v. Christy, 200 N.W.2d 834 (Iowa 1972); see also
infra notes 172-78 and accompanying text.
162. See supra notes 103-07 and accompanying text.
163. Ross Island Sand & Gravel Co. v. General Ins. Co. of Am., 472 F.2d 750, 752 (9th
Cir. 1973).
164. "It of course follows that 'notice' pleading permitted under the federal rules makes
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Most courts hold that when the complaint provides insuffi-
cient facts for a determination of coverage, but the insurer knows
or could reasonably ascertain the unpleaded true facts that would
bring the claim within coverage, the actual facts control and estab-
lish the insurer's duty to defend. 1" In Pacific Indemnity Co. v.
Run-AFord Co.,"' an employee of the insured, a package delivery
company, left a parcel at the plaintiff's house against the front
door when he found no one home. The plaintiff entered through
the rear door and injured herself later when she exited out the
front and tripped over the parcel.
167
The insurance policy in Run-A-Ford covered accidental inju-
ries "arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of the [in-
sured] automobile."" 8 The plaintiff's complaint alleged only that
the negligent placement of the parcel was the proximate cause of
her injuries, but did not refer to the use of the insured vehicle.
Because its obligation to defend did not appear from the alle-
gations of the complaint, the insurer contended that it had no duty
to defend; moreover, the pertinent unpleaded facts were irrelevant
to the determination of the duty to defend. The Supreme Court of
Alabama rejected this position, holding that when the complaint's
allegations inadequately resolve the coverage issue in a declaratory
judgment action, the court could examine the facts actually proved
by admissible evidence. 1" The court decided not to be constrained
by the language of the duty to defend provision and proceeded to
adopt its own construction:
The question is: Is insurer's agreement, to defend any suit "al-
leging such injury," to be construed as an agreement to defend
only a suit in which the complaint, in itself and without the aid
of other facts, contains allegations sufficient to establish the con-
clusion that the injury alleged is covered by the policy; or, is the
agreement to be construed as one to defend a suit in which the
complaint alleges an injury which is within the policy coverage
but can be shown to be within the coverage only when facts,
difficult application of the principle that the insurer's duty to defend is to be determined by
the plaintiff's complaint-a doctrine which was developed when pleadings were considerably
more specific." Babcock & Wilcox Co. v. Parsons Corp., 430 F.2d 531, 536 (8th Cir. 1970).
165. Metcalfe Bros. v. American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 484 F. Supp. 826 (W.D. Va. 1980)
(complaint did not indicate whether decedents were insured's employees, but insurer knew
actual facts; insurer had duty to defend under policy covering injuries resulting in death to
employees acting within course of their employment).
166. 276 Ala. 311, 161 So. 2d 789 (1964).
167. Id. at 313, 161 So. 2d at 789-90.
168. Id. at 314, 161 So. 2d at 790.
169. Id. at 318-19, 161 So. 2d at 795.
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which do exist but are not alleged in the complaint, are taken
into consideration? The policy does not provide which construc-
tion shall be adopted. Under the rule that the policy must be
liberally construed in favor of the insured, the latter construc-
tion must be adopted. Under the latter construction, facts not
alleged in the complaint may be considered.1 70
Under the actual facts in Run-A-Ford, the injury stemmed
from the use of the insured vehicle and consequently was within
the policy's coverage. As a result, the insurer had breached its duty
to defend despite the omission of these facts from the allegations
of the complaint.171
In New Hampshire Insurance Co. v. Christy,17' the Supreme
Court of Iowa reached the Run-A-Ford result, albeit on different
grounds. In Christy the insurer brought a declaratory judgement
action to determine its liability under an insurance policy issued to
Mr. Christy. The policy covered him, members of his household,
and any person driving with his permission, but not cars owned by
others.
1 78
Evidently, Christy's married daughter, Mrs. Sankey, was in-
volved in a traffic accident while driving Mrs. Christy's Buick. The
insurer refused to defend a negligence action against Sankey be-
cause the complaint did not reveal who owned the Buick. 74 At the
trial of the insurer's action for a declaratory judgment, in which
Sankey counterclaimed to recover the costs of defense, no proof
was offered that would have attacked her status as an insured.
Rather, the insurer contended that it was not liable on the ground
that Sankey owned the Buick. 17  The insurer argued that its re-
fusal to defend was justified under the exclusive pleading test.
While noting the general propriety of the exclusive pleading
test, the court concluded that the test was inapplicable because of
170. Id. (emphasis added).
171. On the issue of coverage, the court decided that the process of taking the package
from the truck and placing it on the porch arose from the use of the truck and was therefore
within the policy's coverage. Id. at 315, 161 So. 2d at 792.
172. 200 N.W.2d 834 (Iowa 1972).
173. Id. at 836.
174. Specifically, the complaint did not disclose whether the defendant was driving
with the permission of the named insured, whether the insured owned the automobile, or
whether the defendant was a member of the named insured's household. As discussed ear-
lier, supra notes 148 & 161 and accompanying text, these facts were irrelevant to the plain-
tiff's claim for negligence.
175. The jury found, in response to a written interrogatory, that Mrs. Sankey was not
the car's owner. 200 N.W.2d at 837.
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the extraneous facts in the record. 17e The court reasoned that the
facts essential to the question of coverage17 7 were not necessary to
the plaintiff's allegations in a claim for negligence. Moreover, even
if the facts were alleged in the complaint, the underlying trial be-
tween the insured and the plaintiff would focus on Sankey's negli-
gence, and would not necessarily resolve the factual issue concern-
ing coverage.1 7 8 The court concluded,
Since the draftsman of a pleading against the Insured is not
ordinarily interested in the question of coverage which later
arises between the insurer and insured, an insured's right to a
defense by its insurer should not be made to depend upon the
allegations a third party chooses to put in his petition.17
The Christy rationale differs considerably from that in Run-
A-Ford. The Run-A-Ford court found the duty to defend clause
ambiguous and concluded that its language did not support the use
of the exclusive pleading test.16 0 The Christy court ignored the
possible ambiguity of the clause and decided instead that the ex-
clusive pleading test is inapplicable whenever a complaint fails to
determine coverage.6 1
Some jurisdictions have adopted a third approach requiring
the insurer to investigate the underlying facts whenever the com-
plaint fails to determine coverage. If the insurer investigates and
learns of the true facts bringing the claim within coverage, it must
176. Id. at 839.
177. See supta note 174.
178. The allegations in a pleading are not, in all circumstances and situations, the
decisive factor in determining whether there exists a duty on the part of the
insurance company to defend. This is especially true when the duty to defend
depends upon a factual issue which will not be resolved by the trial of the third
party's suit against the insured, the duty to defend may depend upon the actual
facts and not upon the allegations in the pleading.
... In order to state a cause of action under these circumstances plaintiff
was required to allege [the insured] was negligent,.. . that her negligence was a
proximate cause of the (plaintiff's] injuries and the amount and extent of dam-
ages claimed. It was not essential in order to state a cause of action upon which
relief could be granted. . . that plaintiff allege those matters the insurance com-
pany claims were omitted from the . . . petition. In fact, evidence tending to
support those facts would have been irrelevant in the trial of the [negligence]
action.
200 N.W.2d at 838 (emphasis added); see supra note 148.
179. 200 N.W.2d at 838.
180. This rationale is potentially broader than that used in Christy; indeed, the Run-A-
Ford court's finding that the duty to defend clause is ambiguous implies that the court
could reject the exclusive pleading test under all circumstances.
181. 200 N.W.2d at 838-39.
19821
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
defend the entire suit. As a corollary, if the insurer refuses to in-
vestigate the facts, and the court later finds that the insurer knew,
or should have known, of the true but unpleaded facts, the insurer
will be liable for the costs of defense.
18
2
A Washington appellate court specifically imposed this duty to
investigate on the insurer in Insurance Co. of North America v.
Insurance Co. of Pennsylvania. 1 8 The insured's pilot attempted to
extinguish a cigarette on the fuselage of a helicopter. A forest fire
resulted and another helicopter crashed, killing a firefighter stand-
ing on the ground. The insured had two insurance policies: an avia-
tion policy covering injuries arising out of the use of the aircraft;
the other expressly excluded such injuries.'"
The insurer who had issued the aviation policy refused to de-
fend on the ground that the complaint did not allege a covered
claim.185 The Washington court acknowledged the exclusive plead-
ing test, but refused to apply it because under the circumstances
the complaint failed to adequately resolve the issue of coverage.'"
Instead, the court imposed upon the insurer a duty to investigate
the underlying facts to determine whether its policy actually cov-
ered the event.1 87
182. Farmer's Home Mut. Ins. Co. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 20 Wash. App. 815, 583
P.2d 644 (1978), review denied, 91 Wash. 1014, cert. denied, 442 U.S. 942 (1979).
183. 17 Wash. App. 331, 562 P.2d 1004 (1977).
184. Id. at 333, 562 P.2d at 1005.
185. The pertinent allegation read: "The fire ... was started by the defendant EMCO
Helicopters, Inc.'s negligence, in that one of its employees acting within the scope and du-
ties of his employment carelessly and negligently failed to extinguish a cigarette, which ciga-
rette ignited forest debris and resulted in the fire." Id. at 334, 562 P.2d at 1005. Since the
plaintiff did not allege that the employee was operating the helicopter at the time of the
incident, the insurer felt justified in refusing to defend.
186. Id.
187. "[If the allegations of the third party's complaint are inadequate to determine the
character of the claim, the facts giving rise to the potential liability must be investigated."
Id. (citations omitted). Other jurisdictions have reached the same result without necessarily
imposing a duty to investigate. Thus, in Associated Indem. Co. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am.,
68 IMI. App. 3d 807, 386 N.E.2d 529 (1979), the court stated:
[E]ven though the complaint, standing alone, may not fairly apprise the insurer
that the third party is suing the putative insured on an occurrence potentially
within the policy's coverage, the insurer is obligated to conduct the putative in-
sured's defense if the insurer has knowledge of true but unpleaded facts, which,
taken together with the complaint's allegations, indicate that the claim is within
• . . the policy's coverage. .. . To hold otherwise would allow the insurer to
construct a formal fortress of the third party's pleadings and to retreat behind
its walls, thereby successfully ignoring true but unpleaded facts within its knowl-
edge that require it, under the insurance policy, to conduct the putative in-
sured's defense.
Id. at 816-17, 386 N.E.2d at 536 (emphasis added; footnote and citations omitted). The
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Thus, under the third factual possibility, if the complaint is
unclear or ambiguous as to coverage, and the insurer knows or
could reasonably ascertain that the unpleaded facts indicate that
the claim is within coverage, the insurer cannot rely on the exclu-
sive pleading test to avoid its duty to defend. In this situation the
exclusive pleading test is inefficacious because its rationale de-
pends upon a definitive statement of facts that clarifies the cover-
age issue. Unless the allegations are detailed, the existence of an
insurer's duty to defend should depend upon the unpleaded actual
facts showing coverage.
D. SITUATION 4: The allegations are unclear, conclusory, or
ambiguous as to coverage; the unpleaded actual facts indicate
noncoverage or the applicability of an exclusion.
If the factual test applies to require the insurer to defend a
suit when the complaint is ambiguous as to coverage and the ac-
tual facts show coverage, should the factual test also apply to re-
lieve an insurer of its defense obligation when the complaint is am-
biguous and the true facts show noncoverage or the applicability of
a policy exclusion? Basic fairness dictates that the same rule
should apply in both situations. When the complaint is inconclu-
sive, perhaps courts would not hesitate to apply the factual test to
relieve an insurer of its duty to defend as long as the parties are on
an equal footing. In fact, however, the parties usually are not
equally situated. Most courts recognize that the duty to defend
clauses-as well as other insurance policy provisions-are stan-
dardized and not subject to alteration through rigorous
negotiation.1as
Since insurance policies are generally deemed to be adhesion
contracts,189 a court might jtstifiably refuse to apply the factual
test in situation (4). This will prevent an insurer from avoiding its
defense obligation. Moreover, the significant distinction between
court refused to impose an affirmative duty to investigate, but noted that its holding was
limited to unpleaded facts brought to the insurer's attention and known to be correct. Id. at
817 n.5, 386 N.E.2d at 536 n.5.
Approximately a year later, in La Rotunda v. Royal Globe Ins. Co., 87 Ill. App. 3d 446,
408 N.E.2d 928 (1980), the court held that when the insurer learned through its own investi-
gation that a policy exclusion might not apply, and the complaint did not conclusively es-
tablish coverage or an exclusion, the court would deem the results of the insurer's investiga-
tion to be "unpleaded [facts] known to the insurer which indicate that the claim was
potentially within the policy's coverage." Id. at 452, 408 N.E.2d at 934.
188. See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
189. Id.
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fact patterns (3) and (4) justifies a court's refusal to apply the
same rule in both factual settings. Invariably, the court will resolve
all doubts in favor of the insured because of the parties' disparate
bargaining power.190 To accomplish this, the court will broadly
construe in the insured's favor all provisions of the contract sus-
taining coverage, and narrowly construe all provisions excluding
coverage.11
Thus, in situation (3), when the complaint does not defini-
tively establish coverage but the actual facts indicate coverage, a
court should apply the factual test and find a duty to defend. In
situation (4), however, the insurer is attempting to avoid its de-
fense obligation on the basis of an exclusionary provision. Because
exclusionary provisions are narrowly construed, and the complaint
raises doubts as to their application, a court should resolve the am-
biguity in favor of the insured and refuse to apply the factual test
if it would negate the defense obligation. If a court were to apply
the factual test equally in both situations, it would give the same
weight and consideration to both an exclusionary provision and a
basic coverage provision. This, of course, would violate the princi-
ple that the two provisions should be treated differently.
A narrow reading of Lee v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. 1 "0
supports this argument. One could not determine from the com-
plaint in Lee whether the plaintiff's injuries were excluded from
coverage under the policy exclusion relating to the "use" of an ele-
vator. The Lee court found that the injuries did in fact result from
a use of the elevator within the policy exclusion. Consequently, the
insurer had no duty to indemnify.19' Because the complaint did
not resolve the question whether the exclusion applied, the Lee
court believed the resolution of the doubt as to the duty to defend
should be in the insured's favor. The court concluded that the ac-
tual facts indicative of an exclusion were irrelevant if the com-
plaint did not clearly reveal an exclusion: "When,. . . as here, the
complaint comprehends an injury which may be within the policy,
we hold that the promise to defend includes it."194
190. See, e.g., Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co., 65 Cal. 2d 263, 419 P.2d 168, 54 Cal. Rptr. 104
(1966); West v. MacDonald, 103 N.J. Super. 201, 247 A.2d 20 (App. Div. 1967).
191. See supra notes 111-13 and accompanying text.
192. 178 F.2d 750 (2d Cir. 1949) (L. Hand, J.); see supra notes 14-21 and accompanying
text.
193. 178 F.2d at 751.
194. Id. at 753; Bee, e.g., Brooklyn & Queens Allied Oil Burner Serv. Co. v. Security
Mut. Ins. Co., 27 Misc. 2d 401, 208 N.Y.S.2d 259 (Sup. Ct. 1960). But cf. Ross Island Sand &
Gravel Co. v. General Ins. Co., 472 F.2d 750 (9th Cir. 1973). In Ross Island the complaint
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Once courts accept the position that the insurance policy is an
adhesion contract executed by parties having unequal bargaining
power, the courts should compensate for this disparity by refusing
to apply the factual test when the complaint is ambiguous as to
coverage but the actual facts show an exclusion. Only when an ex-
cluded claim clearly appears on the face of the complaint,1 5 and
that claim necessarily and inexorably falls within the policy exclu-
sion, should the court indulge the insurer by finding that no duty
to defend exists."'
was too general for a determination of whether the claim was for covered damages. The
actual facts elicited through discovery showed an exclusion, but the insured argued that
under Oregon's code pleading system the exclusive pleading test applied. The court dis-
agreed because the plaintiff had commenced the action in federal court; under notice plead-
ing, the actual facts, rather than the allegations of the complaint, determined the defense
obligation. Accordingly, no duty to defend existed because the facts showed an exclusion.
195. See, e.g., Mol v. Holt, 86 Ill. App. 3d 838, 409 N.E.2d 20 (1980). In Holt a car
accident occurred between Mr. Holt and the plaintiffs. The insurance company had issued
the policy to Holt's mother and designated a 1969 Volkswagen as the insured vehicle. The
policy covered any resident of the insured's household. The policy also covered any addi-
tional vehicle, if proper notice of acquisition was given within thirty days of purchase. The
complaint indicated that Holt was driving a 1967 Camaro, but did not contain any allega-
tions about the vehicle's ownership or that Holt and the insured were related. After tender
of the complaint, the insurer investigated and discovered that Holt had bought the car but
failed to notify the insurer of the purchase, as required. On the basis of the actual facts, the
insurer refused to defend Holt.
The court held that the refusal was wrongful. When a complaint does not clearly allege
facts which, if established, would exclude coverage, the potential of coverage is present, es-
tablishing the duty to defend. The insurer could refuse to defend based on a policy exclu-
sion only when "the complaint, on its face, clearly alleges facts which, if true, would exclude
coverage. . . ." Id. at 840, 409 N.E.2d at 22; see also supra note 65; cf. American Employ-
ers' Ins. Co. v. Continental Casualty Co., 85 N.M. 346, 349, 512 P.2d 674, 677 (1973) ("[Tjhe
duty to defend arises when the facts are not stated with sufficient clarity [to determine]
from the face of the complaint whether the action falls within the coverage of the policy.")
(citing 1 R. LONG, THE LAW OF LIABILITY INSURANCE § 5.02 (1973)).
196. See supra note 56. Not all courts, however, agree with this conclusion. In Atlantic
Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Cook, 619 F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1980), the court construed Alabama law
and held that if a complaint omits certain facts tending to show an exclusion, the exclusive
pleading test does not bar the insurer from presenting evidence demonstrating an exclusion
in a declaratory judgment action. The suit alleged that the insured grandmother negligently
entrusted her grandchild to the care of another, who while driving intoxicated became in-
volved in a car accident that caused the child's death. The mother's complaint omitted any
reference to the accident. Not surprisingly, the policy excluded from coverage injuries aris-
ing from the use of a car.
In the insurer's action for a declaratory judgment, the defendants argued that because
the facts establishing the exclusion were not present on the face of the complaint, the exclu-
sive pleading test compelled a finding of a duty to defend. The court disagreed, however,
maintaining that "the insurer is not barred by the silence of the state-court complaint from
establishing, by proof of ... uncontroverted facts, that it had no duty to defend the tort
suit because the accident sued upon was excluded from the coverage of its policy." Id. at
555. It is difficult to criticize the result of this case because of the possibility of collusion
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E. SITUATION 5: The allegations and the actual facts conflict.
The allegations indicate a policy exclusion; the actual facts
indicate coverage or a potential for coverage.
The fifth factual possibility presents the strongest case for ap-
plying the factual test to impose a duty to defend on the insurer.
In fact, it is within this factual setting that the so-called exception
to the exclusive pleading test originated.19 One of the principal
reasons the factual test, rather than the exclusive pleading test, is
applied in this setting is that the contractual language does not
decisively establish the parties' rights.198 The contract obligates the
insurer to defend any suit alleging a covered claim, even if the alle-
gations are completely groundless or false; the court must deter-
mine the defense obligation solely by evaluating the allegations.
Thus, if the complaint falsely alleges a covered event, but the in-
surer knows of true facts which demonstrate that the claim is not
covered, the insurer generally is still obligated to defend, 9 9 owing
to its express promise to defend groundless, false, or fraudulent
suits.200
The converse of this principle, that the insurer need not de-
fend if false allegations are indicative of an exclusion but the true
facts indicate coverage, does not necessarily follow.201 As one court
between the plaintiff and her mother. See also Ross Island Sand & Gravel Co. v. General
Ins. Co., 472 F.2d 750, 752 (9th Cir. 1973) (complaint cast in broad enough terms to require
insurer to defend; court not required "to avert its eyes from facts properly before it");
Rowell v. Hedges, 434 F.2d 926 (5th Cir. 1970) (under Florida law actual facts control with
no duty to defend when complaint silent as to make and year of car involved in accident,
and actual facts show policy did not cover car).
197. Hardware Mut. Casualty Co. v. Hilderbrandt, 119 F.2d 291 (10th Cir. 1941), was
one of the earliest cases to hold that a duty to defend exists when the false allegations
exclude coverage, but the actual facts establish coverage.
198. See infra text accompanying notes 253-58.
199. Not all courts agree with this conclusion. For a more extensive discussion of this
possibility, see infra notes 242-64 and accompanying text.
200. See Lee v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 178 F.2d 750 (2d Cir. 1949); infra note 255
and accompanying text; see also supra notes 14-22 and accompanying text.
201. The following cases recognize that when the allegations show an exclusion, but the
true facts, known to or reasonably ascertainable by the insurer, indicate coverage, the fac-
tual test creates a duty to defend: Bertschinger v. National Sur. Corp., 449 F.2d 744 (9th
Cir. 1971) (dictum) (applying Alaska law); Milliken v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 338 F.2d 35
(10th Cir. 1964); Hagen Supply Corp. v. Iowa Nat'l Mut. Ins. Co., 331 F.2d 199 (8th Cir.
1964) (dictum) (interpreting Minnesota law); American Motorists Ins. Co. v. Southwestern
Greyhound Lines, 283 F.2d 648 (10th Cir. 1960); Albuquerque Gravel Prod. Co. v. American
Employers Ins. Co., 282 F.2d 218 (10th Cir. 1960) (dictum); McGettrick v. Fidelity & Casu-
alty Co., 264 F.2d 883 (2d Cir. 1959); Journal Pub. Co. v. General Casualty Co., 210 F.2d 202
(9th Cir. 1954); Hardware Mut. Casualty Co. v. Hilderbrandt, 119 F.2d 291 (10th Cir. 1941);
National Indem. Co. v. Flesher, 469 P.2d 360 (Alaska 1970); Commercial Union Ins. Co. v.
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argued:
The conclusion that because the insurance company is
bound to defend a suit alleging a claim covered by its policy,
when in fact the incident giving rise to the claim was outside the
scope of, or was expressly excluded from coverage, therefore the
company is excused from defending a suit alleging facts not cov-
ered by the policy, is a non sequitur. In the former case, the
express agreement to defend is controlling. In the latter case,
there is no express agreement as to the duty to defend, and the
rights of the parties must be determined by fairly construing the
insurance contract in such a way as to carry out its intended
purpose.'"2
Because the insurance policy is arguably silent on the parties'
rights, 08 courts can effect a "fair, if extracontractual construction
Henshall, 262 Ark. 117, 553 S.W.2d 274 (1977); Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co., 65 Cal. 2d 263, 419
P.2d 168, 54 Cal. Rptr. 104 (1966) (dictum); Loftin v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 106 Ga.
App. 287, 127 S.E.2d 53 (1962); Spruill Motors, Inc. v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 212
Kan. 681, 512 P.2d 403 (1973) (overruling its prior decisions in Leonard v. Maryland Casu-
alty Co., 158 Kan. 263, 146 P.2d 378 (1944) and Brown v. Green, 204 Kan. 802, 466 P.2d 299
(1970), which held that an insurer can rely only on the allegations); Shepard Marine Constr.
Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co., 73 Mich. App. 62, 250 N.W.2d 541 (1976); Crum v. Anchor
Casualty Co., 264 Minn. 378, 119 N.W.2d 703 (1963); Mavar Shrimp & Oyster Co. v. United
States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 187 So. 2d 871 (Miss. 1966); City of Palmyra v. Western Casu-
alty & Sur. Co., 477 S.W.2d 428 (Mo. Ct. App. 1972); R.A. Hanson Co. v. Aetna Ins. Co., 26
Wash. App. 290, 612 P.2d 456 (1980) (dictum). But see American Policyholders' Ins. Co. v.
Cumberland Cold Storage Co., 373 A.2d 247, 250 n.1 (Me. 1977) (dictum).
202. McGettrick v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 264 F.2d 883, 886 (2d Cir. 1959). In the
underlying action in McGettrick, an injured customer sued the insured, a restaurant owner,
for assault and battery. The policy covered the incident, unless committed by or at the
direction of the insured. The insurer declined to defend without investigating the incident
to determine whether the insured acted in self-defense. The insured's own attorney had
obtained statements from several witnesses showing that the insured had acted in self-de-
fense. Id. at 885.
After settling the underlying action, the insured sued to collect its costs of defense. At
trial, the jury found that the insured had not committed assault and battery, and that the
insurance company did not conduct a proper investigation. The court concluded that when
the plaintiff falsely alleges an excluded event, but the actual facts indicate coverage, the
actual facts control and the insurer has a duty to defend.
203. See, e.g., Loftin v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 106 Ga. App. 287, 127 S.E.2d 53
(1962):
If the insurer intended otherwise, it could have made its intent clear and
unmistakable by undertaking to defend "unless the complaint alleges facts
which show the claim to be excluded from coverage," or by using other unambig-
uous language, for example: "The. company shall defend claims and suits,
groundless or otherwise, for which it may become liable only when the allega-
tions thereof show injury covered by the policy and do not show the claim to be
excluded by the policy."
Id. at 293, 127 S.E.2d at 58.
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of the insurance policy" 204 in order to fulfill the insured's
expectations.205
Courts that require an insurer to defend a suit alleging facts
within a policy exclusion, when the actual facts trigger coverage,
advance various theories for their position. Some courts suggest
that the present system of notice pleading'" renders the applica-
tion of the exclusive pleading test inappropriate when the known
or discoverable true facts diverge from the alleged facts."0 7 More
recent decisions, however, focus on the reasonable expectations of
the weaker party, the insured.3" In Loftin v. United States Fire
Insurance Co.,39" Mr. Loftin, the insured, brought an action to re-
cover attorney's fees and expenses incurred in defending a suit
stemming from an automobile collision. The plaintiff in the under-
lying tort action alleged that she and the driver were Loftin's
employees.210
The insurer declined to defend since the policy excluded cov-
erage for injuries to employees resulting from the actions of fellow
204. 6 WM. MrrCHELL L. Rav. 473, 475 (1980).
205. See Loftin v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 106 Ga. App. 287, 294, 127 S.E.2d 53, 58
(1962).
206. See, e.g., Journal Pub. Co. v. General Casualty Co., 210 F.2d 202 (9th Cir. 1954):
"One of the outstanding facts of modern litigation is the diminishing importance of initial
pleadings in the light of the ease of amendment and the use of pretrial proceedings to lay
the pleadings on the shelf." Id. at 209.
207. See Milliken v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 338 F.2d 35 (10th Cir. 1964):
This court has consistently held that as a general rule the duty of an insurer
to defend its insured in federal court litigation is determined in the beginning of
the litigation by the coverage afforded by the policy, as compared with the alle-
gations of the complaint filed in the action. But, the allegations .. .are not
conclusive on the issue. The duty to defend may attach at some later stage of the
litigation if the issues of the case are so changed or enlarged as to come within
the policy coverage. The reason for this rule is that " * * [u]nder the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure the dimensions of a lawsuit are not determined by the
pleadings because the pleadings are not a rigid and unchangeable blueprint of
the rights of the parties. * * " Thus, the insurer's duty to defend an action
brought in federal court against its insured may arise or attach at any stage in
the litigation. And the duty does attach where there are facts, extraneous to the
allegations of the pleadings, which, if proved, make out a case against the insurer
[sic] that is covered by the policy and which either are actually brought to the
insurer's attention or could have been discovered by it through a reasonable
investigation.
Id. at 40 (footnotes omitted).
208. See, e.g., National Indem. Co. v. Flasher, 469 P.2d 360 (Alaska 1970); Loftin v.
United States Fire Ins. Co., 106 Ga. App. 287, 127 S.E.2d 53 (1962). See generally Gray v.
Zurich Ins. Co., 65 Cal. 2d 263, 419 P.2d 168, 54 Cal. Rptr. 104 (1966); Note, supra note 121,
at 1328; supra notes 108-10 and accompanying text.
209. 106 Ga. App. 287, 127 S.E.2d 53 (1962).
210. Id. at 287-89, 127 S.E.2d at 54-55.
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employees.2 1 1 The insured notified the insurer that both the plain-
tiff and the driver were not employees but independent contrac-
tors.""' The insurer, however, refused to investigate and ascertain
the true facts. In the underlying tort litigation, the trial court
found, on the basis of the evidence, that the driver was not an em-
ployee and accordingly dismissed the claim against the insured.1 3
On appeal the issue was whether the insurer had a duty to
defend when the false allegations indicated an exclusion but the
actual facts established coverage. The court noted that under this
factual situation the contract was ambiguous as to the rights and
duties of the policyholder and the insurer."' It concluded that the
parties could not have intended for the insurer to ignore true facts,
placing the burden on the insured to conduct his own defense and
prove coverage on the basis of facts already known to the in-
surer. 2 The court construed the intent of the parties as follows:
We must assume that the insurer's undertaking to defend
was intended to afford benefits to the insured... . [W]hen un-
true facts are alleged in the complaint showing an exclusion
from coverage, the insurer need not defend in its own interest,
as it would not be liable for a judgment based upon these untrue
facts. Hence its undertaking to defend will be of definite benefit
to the insured sued by such a complaint when the true facts are
within coverage. We may reasonably presume that the undertak-
ing to defend "with respect to the insurance afforded by this
policy" was intended to give the insured this benefit-to defend
suits when the policy affords insurance according to the true
facts."'
The Loftin court rejected as misleading the suggestion that the al-
legations should determine the duty to defend. Because the de-
fense obligation is contractual, the contract governs the duty to de-
fend; when the contract is ambiguous, the court must ascertain the
intent of the parties.'"
211. Id. at 288, 127 S.E.2d at 55.
212. Many of the cases under fact situation (5) turn on the insured's relationship with
the injured party. See, e.g., Journal Pub. Co. v. General Casualty Co., 210 F.2d 202 (9th Cir.
1954); Hardware Mut. Casualty Co. v. Hilderbrandt, 119 F.2d 291 (10th Cir. 1941); National
Indem. Co. v. Flesher, 469 P.2d 360 (Alaska 1970); Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Henshall,
262 Ark. 117, 553 S.W.2d 274 (1977); Crum v. Anchor Casualty Co., 264 Minn. 378, 119
N.W.2d 703 (1963).
213. 106 Ga. App. at 289, 127 S.E.2d at 55.
214. Id. at 292, 127 S.E.2d at 57.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 293, 127 S.E.2d at 57-58.
217. Id. at 294, 127 S.E.2d at 58. The court concluded:
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1. THE DUTY TO INVESTIGATE
When the complaint alleges facts within a policy exception,
and the insured notifies the insurer of contrary facts that ostensi-
bly bring the claim within coverage, many jurisdictions impose
upon the insurer an affirmative duty to investigate the facts before
declining to defend the claim.'1 8 The duty to investigate, although
perhaps burdensome to the insurer,"'1 is the most expeditious ap-
proach when the alleged facts conflict with the actual facts and the
This policy cannot be construed to have intended other than that, when the
insured in good faith complies with the terms of the policy requiring him to give
notice to the insurer of claims and suits, the insurer undertakes to ascertain the
true facts, with respect to an alleged exclusion from coverage and its duty to
defend rests thereon. It would not be reasonable to say that it was the intention
of the contracting parties, when the insured has given all notice and information
required of him, that the assertions of a third party, a stranger to the contract,
rather than the true facts, be allowed to determine the rights between the con-
tracting parties, unless such an intention is clearly manifested by the terms of
the contract, as in the undertaking to defend groundless suits.
Id. at 296, 127 S.E.2d at 59.
218. The rule is stated as follows: The insurer must defend against a complaint alleging
facts within a policy exception when it knows or could reasonably ascertain facts that indi-
cate coverage. This formulation necessarily forces the insurer to conduct an investigation. If
the insurer does not, and the court later rules that the facts were "reasonably ascertain-
able," the insurer will be liable for breaching its defense obligation. Bertschinger v. National
Sur. Corp., 449 F.2d 744 (9th Cir. 1971) (under Alaska law insurer must investigate before
declining coverage); American Motorists Ins. Co. v. Southwestern Greyhound Lines, 283
F.2d 648,650 (10th Cir. 1960) (applying Missouri law) ("The record indicates persuasively
that through a reasonable investigation, American could readily have ascertained that, de-
spite the allegations contained in the petitions . . . there was substantial evidence available
to show that the actual fact . . . was that the passenger fell after alighting from the bus
...."); McGettrick v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 264 F.2d 883 (2d Cir. 1959) (applying Ver-
mont law) (investigation would have revealed that insured acted in self-defense rather than
the claimed intentional tort of assault and battery); Loftin v. United States Fire Ins. Co.,
106 Ga. App. 287, 127 S.E.2d 53 (1962) (investigation would have disclosed that injured
party was not insured's employee); Spruill Motors, Inc. v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co.,
212 Kan. 681, 512 P.2d 403 (1973) (insurer refused to defend even though its own investiga-
tor concluded that the injury, although alleged as intentional, was more likely unintentional
and therefore within coverage); see also American States Ins. Co. v. Aetna Life & Casualty
Co., 379 N.E.2d 510 (Ind. Ct. App. 1978); Johnson v. Aid Ins. Co., 287 N.W.2d 663 (Minn.
1980) (while insurer may initially rely on allegations to determine its defense obligation,
allegations not decisive; once insured has made some factual showing that claim is covered,
insurer must investigate facts).
219. A typical insurance policy reserves to the insurer the right (but not the duty) to
investigate the claim brought against the insured. See supra note 2. Because insurers inves-
tigate as a matter of course to determine the merits of the action against the insured and
evaluate settlement prospects, the suggestion that a duty to investigate the facts would be
burdensome is unpersuasive. The duty to investigate, moreover, would not arise in every
case. In any event, the insurer cannot complain, because it is responsible for the ambiguity
that the policy creates in fact situations (3), (4), (5), and (6).
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latter indicate coverage3 20 The reason for this is that the question
of coverage usually turns on facts that the insurer can determine
objectively221 prior to trial.
2 2
2
One of the major benefits of the exclusive pleading test is that
the insurer can determine its duty to defend at the outset of the
220. Some courts apply a duty to investigate when the complaint is silent on questions
of coverage. See supra text accompanying notes 158-96; see also R.A. Hanson Co. v. Aetna
Ins. Co., 26 Wash. App. 290, 612 P.2d 456 (1980) (although court recognized duty to investi-
gate rule when complaint ambiguous as to coverage, that duty did not attach in this case
because complaint was unambiguous).
221. The insurer can objectively determine the applicability of several exclusionary pro-
visions before trial. For example, when a policy excludes injuries to employees, the question
of coverage focuses on the relatioiship between the injured party and the insured. See, e.g.,
Journal Pub. Co. v. General Casualty Co., 210 F.2d 202 (9th Cir. 1954); Hardware Mut.
Casualty Co. v. Hilderbrandt, 119 F.2d 291 (10th Cir. 1941); National Indem. Co. v. Flesher,
469 P.2d 360 (Alaska 1970); Loftin v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 106 Ga. App. 287, 127
S.E.2d 53 (1962); Crum v. Anchor Casualty Co., 264 Minn. 378, 119 N.W.2d 703 (1963).
Other policies exclude injuries that occur in a certain place. Cf. American Motors Ins. Co. v.
Southwestern Greyhound Lines, 283 F.2d 648 (10th Cir. 1960) (allegation that injury oc-
cured while alighting from bus within express policy exclusion, but jury found that plaintiff
was injured after alighting; consequently, insurer had duty to defend based on actual facts).
222. When the question of coverage is a subjective matter, depending on the insured's
state of mind, some courts hold that the insurer need not investigate or assume the defense
until the jury determines the actual facts. In a declaratory judgment action regarding the
insurer's duty to defend, the court cannot make any findings as to an alleged intentional.
injury because this would interfere with the central factual issue in the underlying tort trial.
Harbin v. Assurance Co. of Am., 308 F.2d 748 (10th Cir. 1962); Maryland Casualty Co. v.
Peppers, 64 Ill. 2d 187, 355 N.E.2d 24 (1976); Employers' Fire Ins. Co. v. Beals, 103 R.I. 771,
240 A.2d 397 (1968).
In Harbin the injured party brought suit in state court on a claim of assault and bat-
tery. The insurer then brought a declaratory judgment action in federal court to determine
coverage and its duty to defend. In two previous decisions, American Motorists Ins. Co. v.
Southwestern Greyhound Lines, 283 F.2d 648 (10th Cir. 1960) and Hardware Mut. Casualty
Co. v. Hilderbrandt, 119 F.2d 291 (10th Cir. 1941), the Tenth Circuit had ruled that the
actual facts, rather than the pertinent but false allegations, controlled the duty to defend.
The Harbin court distinguished the prior cases on the ground that the actual facts had
already been established. Because the actual facts were not yet determined in Harbin, the
insurer did not have a present duty to defend. The court also emphasized that an investiga-
tion into the subjective question of intent was not required:
The insurer's liability depends on whether the injury was caused intention-
ally by the insured. The difficulty in the ascertainment of a state of mind needs
no amplification. Reasonable men may Understandingly differ as to the intent of
another because they may draw conflicting inferences from physical facts. For
this reason the argument that the insurer should have conducted an investiga-
tion and relied on the results thereof does not persuade us. Intent is to be deter-
mined, not by the insurer's investigators, but by the finder of the facts in the
lawsuit brought by the claimant of the injuries.
Harbin, 308 F.2d at 749-50 (emphasis added). But cf. McGettrick v. Fidelity & Casualty Co.,
264 F.2d 883 (2d Cir. 1959); Spruill Motors, Inc. v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 212
Kan. 681, 512 P.2d 403 (1973). McGettrick and Spruill recognized that when the complaint
alleges an intentional injury that is excluded from the policy's coverage, the insurer is obli-
gated to defend based on facts ascertained during the insurer's investigation.
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litigation by comparing the complaint with the insurance policy.
The factual test, however, does not share this advantage because
the actual facts presumably remain unproven until after the com-
pletion of the underlying trial. The duty to investigate corrects this
apparent flaw in the factual test. Since the application of most ex-
clusionary provisions depends upon facts that the insurer can ob-
jectively determine before trial, the insurer's investigation will
enable it to determine its defense obligation soon after the lawsuit
is filed.
224
Once the insurer has investigated, it should assume the de-
fense of the complaint against the insured if the insurer has dis-
covered facts indicating the possibility (not the probability) of cov-
erage. 2  In the usual case when the status of the injured partys"
or the identity of the instrumentality causing injury127 is at issue,
the insurer's investigation will result in a definitive finding. In
some cases, however, an insurer's investigation may not definitively
resolve the question of coverage, because either the insured's state
of mind is at issue,28 or coverage depends upon a close question of
223. See supra cases cited note 221.
224. In Hardware Mut. Casualty Co. v. Hilderbrandt, 119 F.2d 291 (10th Cir. 1941), the
court, quoted from the insured's brief a hypothetical case which illustrates this principle:
A owns two automobiles, a Ford and a Nash. The Ford is covered by the policy.
of the company but the Nash is not. A, while driving the Ford, negligently in-
jures a third party and this party brings an action for damages alleging that A
was driving the Nash. A notifies the company of the accident, furnishes it a copy
of the petition, and explains to it that the car actually involved in the accident
was the Ford and not the Nash. The company shuts its eyes to the information
given to it by A as to the car actually involved in the accident, relies solely upon
the allegations of the petition, makes no investigation of the facts and circum-
stances, denies liability and refuses to defend except upon a nonwaiver which A
declines to give. A undertakes the defense of the action with counsel of his own
and negotiates a prudent settlement for a stipulated sum which he pays, and
then makes demand upon the company to reimburse him which it declines to do,
taking the position that there is no coverage as reflected by the allegations of the
petition.
Id. at 299-300.
The court concluded: "The hypothetical case appropriately illustrates with emphasis
the scope and effect of the contention of the company. Upon further consideration, we think
the contention [of the insurer that its duty was determined by the allegations alone] must
fail." Id. at 300.
225. Cf. Capoferri v. Allstate Ins. Co., 322 So. 2d 625 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975); supra notes
51-56 and accompanying text. In Capoferri an investigation revealed the possibility that the
claim was covered. Consequently, the insurer should have defended.
226. For example, the question may arise whether the injured party is actually an em-
ployee or an independent contractor. See generally cases cited supra note 221.
227. The applicability of an exclusion may depend, for example, on whether or not the
insured's automobile was covered.
228. See supra note 222.
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fact. Commercial Union InsLvrance Co. v. Henshall2 9 illustrates
the latter possibility. In Henshall the insurer brought a declaratory
judgment action to determine its obligations under a homeowner
policy to defend a tort action against the insured. Dr. Alstadt, the
plaintiff, alleged that while he was a business invitee on the in-
sured's premises, he injured himself when he fell over a wire fence.
The insured's policy covered injuries resulting from an "occur-
rence,"2 °0 but excluded injuries arising from a business pursuit." '
The evidence in the declaratory judgment action revealed that
Alstadt recorded some music at the insured's studio, but inadver-
tently left his music at the studio after the recording session. Al-
stadt returned to the studio later to retrieve his music. Noticing
that the studio was locked, Alstadt proceeded to the insured's
house nearby. Somewhere between the studio and the house, Al-
stadt fell. Relying on the exclusive pleading test, the insurer re-
fused to defend since the plaintiff alleged that the fence was on the
business premises. 2 The Supreme Court of Arkansas held that
the exclusive pleading test was not applicable because a simple in-
vestigation of the property, coupled with the insured's statement,
would have raised questions regarding Alstadt's true status and his
activities.283 The court stated that the insurer "may not close its
eyes to facts it knew or should have known, because they were eas-
ily ascertainable, 2 4 and held that the insurer breached its duty to
defend2 "3 The insurer must therefore defend even when its investi-
229. 262 Ark. 117, 553 S.W.2d 274 (1977).
230. See supra note 1.
231. 262 Ark. at 120, 553 S.W.2d at 275-76.
232. The evidence showed that Dr. Alstadt probably fell over a fence located close to
the house. The testimony indicated that the insured used the fence to house his dog. The
plaintiff did not allege, however, that the fence was connected with a "business pursuit." Id.
at 120-22, 553 S.W.2d at 276-77.
233. Dr. Alstadt came to the premises after business hours to retrieve a forgotten
article and it is quite likely that his injuries occurred, not on the part of the
premises devoted to business pursuits, but on the premises of [the insureds']
home and that both his "activities," and whatever "activities" of [the insureds]
are relied upon as negligent acts or omission, are ordinarily incident to nonbusi-
ness pursuits.
Id. at 121-22, 553 S.W.2d at 276.
234. Id.; see also Shepard Marine Constr. Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co., 73 Mich. App.
62, 250 N.W.2d 541 (1976) (investigation would have revealed that, contrary to the allega-
tions, the damage occurred after operations were completed); City of Palmyra v. Western
Casualty & Sur. Co., 477 S.W.2d 428 (Mo. Ct. App. 1972) (investigation would have dis-
closed that, despite allegations to the contrary, the tractor was operated solely for locomo-
tion, which was within the policy's coverage).
235. This decision supports the proposition that when the allegations expressly exclude
coverage but the true facts indicate the possibility of coverage, the insurer must defend. In
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gation does not decisively demonstrate coverage, if the discovered
facts show the possibility of coverage. 86
2. CONFLICT OF INTERESTS
A conflict of interest may exist if the insurer must defend a
suit that alleges events falling under an exclusion when the known
or discoverable facts show potential coverage.37 Since the duty to
indemnify is always based on the facts established at trial, the in-
terests of the insurer and the insured obviously diverge. The in-
sured would prefer that its liability be limited to negligence, which
the policy covers and against which the insurer has a duty to in-
demnify. The insurer, on the other hand, would benefit if liability
were imposed on the basis of an excluded intentional injury, which
would negate the duty to indemnify. The insurer argues, therefore,
that one cannot expect, nor require, the insurer to defend the in-
sured in this situation and maintain the requisite fidelity.
The great majority of courts that have faced this apparent di-
lemma of the insurer hold that a conflict of interest, by itself, will
not excuse an insurer from its primary contractual obligation of
defending its insured.' They conclude that the conflict of interest
Henshall the insurer understandably refused to defend because the complaint alleged that
the plaintiff was a "business invitee," and the unpleaded objective facts indicated that the
plaintiff's injuries could have resulted from the insured's business pursuits. According to the
court, the duty to defend attached because the facts before the court suggested a possibility
of coverage, not because the established facts definitively indicated coverage. Indeed, the
court refused to decide that a duty to indemnify existed, postponing that question until
after the completion of the underlying trial. As the court concluded:
We do not yet know whether the portion of the fence Dr. Alstadt fell over was
the one connected to the home and there was no evidence that the other parts of
the fence served the same purpose as the part referred to in the deposition. The
facts have not been fully developed and will not be until the personal injury
action is tried. However, appellees did present a prima facie case of coverage
from which the duty to defend resulted.
262 Ark. at 123-24, 553 S.W.2d at 277.
236. But see Harbin v. Assurance Co. of Am., 308 F.2d 748 (10th Cir. 1962); supra note
222.
237. The conflict of interest theory is equally applicable when the complaint contains
allegations partially within and outside coverage, and when the complaint alleges an inten-
tional injury exclusion and the actual facts are not established. See, e.g., Howard v. Russell
Stover Candies, Inc., 649 F.2d 620 (Sth Cir. 1981) (applying Missouri law) (conflict of inter-
est did not relieve insurer of duty to defend against complaint alleging claims within and
outside policy's coverage provisions).
238. See, e.g., Bituminous Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Izzy Rosen's, Inc., 493 F.2d 257
(6th Cir. 1974); Babcock & Wilcox Co. v. Parsons Corp., 430 F.2d 531 (8th Cir. 1970); Steyer
v. Westvaco Corp., 450 F. Supp. 384 (D. Md. 1978); Burd v. Sussex Mut. Ins. Co., 56 N.J.
383, 267 A.2d 7 (1970); American Employers' Ins. Co. v. Continental Casualty Co., 85 N.M.
346, 512 P.2d 674 (1973); Employers' Fire Ins. Co. v. Beals, 103 R.I. 771, 240 A.2d 397
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contention is without merit in view of the express promise to de-
fend a suit alleging a covered event, even if groundless, false, or
fraudulent. 239 These courts, as well as commentators,' 0 note the
existence of alternatives that can ameliorate the apparent conflict
between the insurer and the insured.'4
F. SITUATION 6: The allegations and the actual facts conflict.
The allegations trigger coverage; the actual facts activate an
exclusion or show noncoverage.
Situation (6) is the converse of situation (5). The question
thus becomes: If the factual test establishes a duty to defend when
known or discoverable facts show coverage, contrary to the allega-
tions of the complaint, should this test also apply to negate a duty
to defend when the allegations show coverage but the actual facts
indicate noncoverage or an exclusion? Or stated differently, when a
variance exists between the alleged and actual facts, should the
factual test always control the determination of the duty to
defend?"2'
At first glance, logic and uniformity of application would
seemingly dictate using the factual test in both settings. Yet, the
majority of courts examining the question have held that when the
complaint indicates coverage, the insurer must defend despite its
knowledge of contrary facts suggesting noncoverage or an exclu-
sion.' In applying the exclusive pleading test in situation (6),
(1968).
239. See cases cited supra note 238. Contra Williams v. Farmers Mut., 245 Or. 557, 423
P.2d 518 (1967)" (conflict of interest eliminated insurer's duty to defend).
240. See generally Employers' Fire Ins. Co. v. Beals, 103 R.I. 771, 240 A.2d 397 (1968);
Comment, supra note 13; Note, Use of the Declaratory Judgment to Determine a Liability
Insurer's Duty to Defend-Conflict of Interests, 41 IND. L.J. 87 (1965).
241. If a conflict exists, for example, the insurer may be required to provide its insured
with independent counsel and pay the reasonable costs of defense. See Howard v. Russell
Stover Candies, Inc., 649 F.2d 620 (8th Cir. 1981).
242. Some courts argue that there is a significant distinction between situations (5) and
(6). See Afcan v. Mutual Fire, Marine & Inland Ins. Co., 595 P.2d 638 (Alaska 1979); infra
notes 245-58 and accompanying text.
243. The, following cases recognize that when the complaint alleges a covered event, but
the actual facts known to the insurer exclude coverage, the insurer must still defend: Colton
v. Swain, 527 F.2d 296 (7th Cir. 1975) (dictum) (applying Illinois law); Lee v. Aetna Casu-
alty & Sur. Co., 178 F.2d 750 (2d Cir. 1949); United Servs. Auto Ass'n v. Glens Falls Ins.
Co., 429 F. Supp. 101 (D. Conn. 1976); Patterson v. American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 304 F.
Supp. 1088 (D. Conn. 1969); Afcan v. Mutual Fire, Marine & Inland Ins. Co., 595 P.2d 638
(Alaska 1979); Missionaries of the Co. of Mary, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 155 Conn.
104, 230 A.2d 21 (1967); Loftin v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 106 Gia. App. 287, 127 S.E.2d
53 (1962) (dictum); Thornton v. Paul, 74 Ill. 2d 132, 384 N.E.2d 335 (1978); Aetna Ins. Co. v.
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rather than the factual test, some of these courts base their deci-
sions upon a significant distinction between fact situations (5) and
(6).244 In Afcan v. Mutual Fire, Marine & Inland Insurance Co.,2
4"
the Supreme Court of Alaska addressed the question whether the
factual test should apply equally in situations (5) and (6). The in-
surer had argued that Alaska case* lawNO supported the proposition
that when a complaint alleges facts within an exclusion, the factual
test applies and requires the insurer to defend if it is notified or
learns through its own investigation that the claim is actually cov-
ered.247 From this the insurer argued that once the allegations con-
flict with the known or ascertainable facts, the allegations no
longer control and are irrelevant in determining the existence of
the duty to defend.248 After its investigation the insurer in A/can
Janson, 60 Ill. App. 3d 975, 377 N.E.2d 296 (1978); American Policyholders' Ins. Co. v. Cum-
berland Cold Storage Co., 373 A.2d 247 (Me. 1977); Dochod v. Central Mut. Ins. Co., 81
Mich. App. 63, 264 N.W.2d 122 (1978); Albany Truck Rental Serv. v. New Hampshire
Merchants Ins. Co., 75 A.D.2d 426, 430 N.Y.S.2d 158 (1980); Employers' Fire Ins. Co. v.
Beals, 103 R.I. 771, 240 A.2d 397 (1968). Contra Kepner v. Western Fire Ins. Co., 109 Ariz.
329, 509 P.2d 222 (1973); Guidry v. Zeringue, 379 So. 2d 813 (La. Ct. App. 1980); Farmers &
Merchants State Bank v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 309 Minn. 14, 242 N.W.2d 840
(1976); Marshall's U.S. Auto Supply v. Maryland Casualty Co., 354 Mo. 455, 189 S.W.2d 529
(1945).
244. See, e.g., Afcan v. Mutual Fire, Marine & Inland Ins. Co., 595 P.2d 638 (Alaska
1979); Missionaries of the Co. of Mary, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 155 Conn. 104,
230 A.2d 21 (1967); infra notes 252-53 and accompanying text.
245. 595 P.2d 638 (Alaska 1979).
246. National Indem. Co. v. Flesher, 469 P.2d 360 (Alaska 1970).
247. 595 P.2d at 644. This factual possibility is, of course, fact situation (5).
248. See, e.g., Kepner v. Western Fire Ins. Co., 109 Ariz. 329, 509 P.2d 222 (1973);
Farmers & Merchants State Bank v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 309 Minn. 14, 242
N.W.2d 840 (1976).
This argument was also attempted in Missionaries of the Co. of Mary, Inc. v. Aetna
Casualty & Sur. Co., 155 Conn. 104, 230 A.2d 21 (1967). The insured, a monastery, was sued
for negligence after a delivery truck driver fell into a ditch on the monastery's property. The
policy covered hazards from "[t]he ownership, maintenance or use of the premises, and all
operations necessary or incidental thereto." Id. at 109, 230 A.2d at 24. The policy excluded
injuries resulting from structural alterations to the premises by the insured or any contrac-
tor. The insurer discovered facts that indicated the insured had contracted with a company
to build an addition, to the monastery. The insured had engaged another contractor to
change the existing overloaded electrical system. This work required the digging of the ditch
that caused the injury.
The injured plaintiff sued the insured for negligence but did not include the facts about
the new addition. According to the complaint, the injury appeared to result from operations
incidental to the maintenance of the premises. The insurer argued that the actual facts
indicating an exclusion excused it from defending the suit. Rejecting this contention, the
court concluded:
This is a misapplication of the rule . . .requiring an insurer to conduct a rea-
sonable investigation before refusing to defend a case in which the third party
complaint, on its face, states facts which appear to bring the case outside the
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had determined that the actual facts showed noncoverage.' 4a
The Supreme Court of Alaska rejected the insurer's argument
and held that once the complaint establishes a duty to defend, the
insurer cannot escape its defense obligation by looking to extrinsic
facts.1 0 In situation (6), therefore, the exclusive pleading test
would apply and require the insurer to defend the suit. The court
reconciled the apparent conflict in Alaska law in fact situations (5)
and (6) by distinguishing the two situations.""1 In situation (5) the
application of the factual test has an inclusionary result, i.e., the
factual test supports coverage and thus a duty to defend. In situa-
tion (6) the application of the factual test has an exclusionary re-
sult, which enables an insurer to evade an otherwise valid obliga-
tion to defend.' 5s One could argue that since the court decided the
exclusive pleading test should apply in situation (6), it favored the
inclusionary result that establishes the insurer's duty to defend .2'
coverage of the policy. The defendant's attempt to invoke the rule where, as in
this case, [the] complaint appears to state facts which bring the case within the
policy coverage is unsound.
Id. at 111, 230 A.2d at 25 (citation omitted).
249. 595 P.2d at 642.
250. Id. at 645.
251. The court explained the distinction in the following manner:
This holding does not conflict with our decision in National Indemnity Co.
v. Flesher, 469 P.2d 360 (Alaska 1970), because the rule we are applying in this
case-that the pleadings control-applies only in those instances where the com-
plaint alleges a claim within the coverage of the policy. In Flesher we held that
the pleadings are not controlling where the complaint alleges a claim not within
the policy . . . . We believe there is a significant distinction between the two
situations-[fact situation (6)] where the complaint states a claim within the
policy but the facts indicate there is no coverage, and [fact situation (5)] where
the complaint states a claim outside the policy but the facts indicate the claim is
actually covered.
Id. at 645-46 (emphasis in original).
252. Id. at 646 n.3. Thus, if the insurer must defend under situation (5), when the alle-
gations indicate an exclusion but the known or ascertainable contrary facts show coverage,
the factual test has an inclusionary effect. If, however, the insurer is relieved of its duty in
situation (6), when the complaint states a claim within the policy but the facts indicate
there is no coverage, the factual test has an exclusionary effect. The Afcan court quoted
Professor Keeton's suggestion:
[Als an inclusionary test, this standard (the nature of the claim against the in-
sured) is . . . consistent with the weight of authority. Quite clearly, however, it
is not reliable as an exclusionary standard. That is, it cannot be relied upon as
the basis for answering a number of questions that may be raised by an insurer's
contention that it has no duty to defend because the victim alleges only a claim
against the insured that falls outside the scope of the insuring agreements.
Id. (emphasis in original) (quoting R. KzrroN, BAsic TEXT ON INSURANcE LAw § 7.6(a), at
464 (1971)).
253. 595 P.2d at 645-46.
19821
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
Although the Afcan court did not reveal why the distinction
between these factual situations warranted the different results in
the selection of the relevant test, there are at least two reasons
supporting the court's distinction. First, the insurance contract
should govern the rights of the parties unless it is silent as to its
applicability in a given situation. In situation (5) the complaint in-
dicates an exclusion while the actual facts trigger coverage. It is
clear that the policy language-the insurer will defend any alleged
covered claim, even if the allegations are groundless, false, or
fraudulent-does not refer at all to the situation in which the com-
plaint falsely alleges an excluded claim. The contract is therefore
silent as to the parties' rights under situation (5). This permits the
court to adopt the factual test in determining whether a duty to
defend exists.25 In situation (6), however, the allegations present a
covered claim while the actual facts indicate an exclusion. Since
the language of the contract expressly obligates the insurer to de-
fend this type of complaint regardless of the allegation's veracity,
the court must apply the contractually mandated exclusive plead-
ing test and find a duty to defend. "'
Second, as noted earlier,"' courts narrowly construe exclusion-
ary provisions in order to sustain coverage whenever possible.
Many courts have extended this principle to provide that unless
the exclusion clearly appears on the face of the complaint, the
court will not relieve the insurer from its defense obligation.'2
7
Since the exclusion in situation (6) does not appear on the face of
the complaint, the court will apply the exclusive pleading test as
254. See supra text accompanying notes 198-205.
255. This view is rooted in a broad holding of Lee v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 178
F.2d 750 (2d Cir. 1949), in which Judge Learned Hand suggested that the language of the
duty to defend provision means:
the insurer will defend the suit, if the injured party states a claim, which, qua
claim, is for an injury "covered" by the policy; it is the claim which determines
the insurer's duty to defend; and it is irrelevant that the insurer may get infor-
mation from the insured, or from any one else, which indicates, or even demon-
strates, that the injury is not in fact "covered."
Id. at 751 (emphasis added).
Thus, if a complaint alleges intentional and negligent acts, and the insured admits to
the insurer that he acted intentionally, the insurer still must defend, although it may not
have to indemnify. See Dochod v. Central Mut. Ins. Co., 81 Mich. App. 63, 264 N.W.2d 122
(1978); Michigan Miller Mut. Ins. Co. v. Christopher, 66 A.D.2d 148, 413 N.Y.S.2d 264
(1979); cf. Aetna Ins. Co. v. Janson, 60 I11. App. 3d 957, 377 N.E.2d 296 (1978) (insured's
admission that he committed arson did not absolve insurer of duty to defend against com-
plaint containing alternative theories of recovery, one of which was within policy coverage).
256. See supra notes 188-96 and accompanying text.
257. See supra note 195.
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both the contract's language and the insured's reasonable expecta-
tions require.5 s
The minority of courts that excuse an insurer from defending
when the actual facts disclose noncoverage or a policy exclusion
apparently disregards the language of the insurance defense provi-
sion. These courts perceive no difference, or attribute no signifi-
cance to the difference, between the factual test's inclusionary ef-
fect in situation (5) and its exclusionary effect in situation (6).
Kepner v. Western Fire Insurance Co.'59 exemplifies the test's ex-
clusionary effect. In Kepner the insured possessed a homeowner's
policy that covered injuries sustained on the premises, but ex-
pressly excluded injuries arising from the insured's business pur-
suits.2 While converting the insured's carport into an office for his
pool service business, an employee injured the insured's grandson.
The complaint against the insured failed to mention that the in-
jury occurred during a business activity, the building of the office.
Relying upon the exclusive pleading test, the insured argued that
because the complaint indicated coverage (or at least did not
unambiguously exclude coverage), the insurer had a duty to defend
notwithstanding the actual facts.
The Supreme Court of Arizona rejected the insured's position,
holding that when the allegations ostensibly indicate coverage, but
the actual facts negate coverage, the insurer has no absolute duty
to defend. The court reasoned:
First, under modern practices, such as the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, followed in Arizona, the complaint serves a no-
tice function and is framed before discovery proceedings crystal-
ize the facts of the case. The trial focuses on the facts as they
exist rather than on facts which might exist under the theory of
recovery in the complaint. Accordingly, the duty to defend
should focus upon the facts rather than upon the allegations of
258. See National Indem. Co. v. Flesher, 469 P.2d 360 (Alaska 1970):
We believe that the rule of Theodore [the exclusive pleading test) is sound
and should be adhered to where the third party's allegations allege facts within
policy coverage despite the insurer's knowledge of facts disclosing a claim
outside policy coverage. In this situation Theodore comports with the reason-
able expectations of the insured as to the defense that will be provided because
it is clear that the insurer has promised to defend any suit alleging a claim
within the coverage of the policy even if such suit is "groundless, false, or
fraudulent."
Id. at 365 (emphasis added).
259. 109 Ariz. 329, 509 P.2d 222 (1973); see also Farmers & Merchants State Bank v.
St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 309 Minn. 14, 242 N.W.2d 840 (1976).
260. 109 Ariz. at 330, 509 P.2d at 223.
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the complaint which may or may not control the ultimate deter-
mination of liability.26
The logic of the Supreme Court of Arizona's decision is defi-
cient for two reasons. First, the court completely disregarded the
language of the duty to defend clause.2e Second, the decision2 3
effectively bases both the duty to defend and the duty to indem-
nify on the actual facts; this violates the axiomatic principle that
the duty to defend is distinct from and broader than the duty to
indemnify.26
Under fact situation (6), then, if a variance exists between the
261. Id. at 331, 509 P.2d at 224.
262. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
263. Unfortunately, the court was faced with obvious collusion between the third-party
plaintiff and the insured. The court might not have considered the factual test had there
been no relationship between the injured plaintiff and the insured.
264. The cases in the minority that apply the factual test in situation (6) involve the
identity of the putative insured, rather than the risk coverage provided by the policy. The
question raised in these cases is whether the false allegation that the defendant is an "in-
sured" will control and trigger a defense obligation, when the party actually is not an in-
sured under the policy's terms. In Williams v. Community Drive-In Theatre, 3 Kan. App. 2d
352, 595 P.2d 724 (1979), the insured's employee shot the plaintiff. The plaintiff sued both
the employee and the insured, alleging that the employee was acting within the scope of her
employment. The insurance policy extended coverage to employees as "omnibus insureds"
only if the employee acted within the scope of employment. At trial the jury found that the
employee had not acted within the scope of her employment. Consequently, the insurer
refused to defend.
The plaintiff, now a judgment creditor of the defendant-employee, argued that the ex-
clusive pleading test should apply. Since the plaintiff had alleged that the defendant was
acting within the scope of her employment, she was therefore an "insured" under the policy.
Accordingly, the insurer had breached its duty to defend. The court disagreed, however,
stating that the insurer had no obligation to defend a stranger to the contract "merely be-
cause the plaintiff alleges that the defendant is an insured or alleges facts which, if true,
would make him an insured." Id. at 355, 595 P.2d at 726. The court reasoned that before the
duty to defend clause could apply, the plaintiff must prove as a matter of fact that the
defendant is an insured. See also Navajo Freight Lines v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 12 Ariz.
App. 424, 471 P.2d 309 (1970) (insurer had no duty to defend against complaint alleging
that defendant was driving with permission of insured when in fact defendant had no such
permission). The Navajo court stated that:
these contractual provisions do not purport to obligate the insurer to defend a
complete stranger to the contract. A sine qua non to the existence of any obliga-
tion to defend, or pay, whether the suit be groundless or otherwise, is the pre-
existing relationship of insurer-insured. The creation of this basic relationship
cannot be left to the imagination of the drafter of a complaint.
Id. at 430, 471 P.2d at 315 (emphasis added); Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Jones, 397 So. 2d 317
(Fla. 4th DCA 1981) (based on exclusive pleading test, allegations in complaint failed to
support finding that plaintiff was an "insured" under her husband's policy; insurer therefore
had no duty to defend). But see American Home Assurance Co. v. Czarniecki, 255 La. 251,
230 So. 2d 253 (1970); Lumbermens Mut. Casualty Co. v. Rollings, 355 So. 2d 1041 (La. Ct.
App. 1978).
DUTY TO DEFEND
alleged facts indicating coverage and the true facts showing non-
coverage or an exclusion, the better-reasoned approach requires
the insurer to defend on the basis of the exclusive pleading test.
Under this fact pattern the contractual language binding the in-
surer to defend a complaint alleging covered claims, even if
groundless, false, or fraudulent, controls the rights of the parties.
VII. CONCLUSION: A SYNTHESIS
The exclusive pleading test-the traditional rule-no longer
serves as the universal standard for determining the existence of
the insurer's duty to defend. Indeed, the modern trend of author-
ity no longer characterizes the factual test as the mere "exception"
to the rule. As a result, courts that apply the exclusive pleading
test automatically in all situations are taking a parochial, if not
altogether unjustifiable, approach.
As presently worded, the duty to defend clause does not and
cannot cover all of the factual possibilities that arise. The modern
and better approach analyzes the duty to defend by determining
first the fact pattern into which the case falls, and then applying
the test that is most appropriate under the circumstances. This is
not to suggest, however, that courts should disregard the defense
provision of the insurance contract. On the contrary, the contract
is dispositive of the duty to defend issue, and establishes that the
exclusive pleading test shall apply, in fact situations (1) and (6).265
But as to fact situations (2), (3), (4), and (5),2" the contract is
silent, or at least ambiguous, with respect to the rights of the par-
ties. Under these fact patterns the court should require the insurer
to defend if the insurer knows, or could reasonably ascertain, facts
that indicate a potentially covered claim. Under these circum-
stances the insurer should investigate and assume the defense if
the claim is actually, or potentially, within the policy's coverage.
The court, therefore, should not hesitate to effect an extracontrac-
tual construction by applying the factual test in order to avoid the
unfairness resulting from the mechanical application of the tradi-
tional rule. If this result seems unfair, the insurer has an alterna-
tive: it can rewrite the duty to defend provision in its contract.
265. See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
266. Id.
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